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Abstract 
 
This thesis reviews the influence of prejudicial social attitudes on jury decision-making in 
rape trials, and considers whether the verdict in rape cases should continue to be 
determined by a jury in Scotland. Rape law reform is recognised internationally as having 
had limited impact to date, in terms of either improving the low conviction rates for rape or 
reducing the systematic re-victimisation of adult female complainers. This issue is 
discussed within the context of negative social attitudes about rape and rape victims, and 
the contribution of these to the gap between law and practice in rape cases. The potential 
influence of different types of prejudicial social attitudes on juror decision-making in rape 
trials is considered in depth, including the extent to which these may negatively impact on 
the outcome of trials. The likely interaction between juror attitudes and the Sexual 
Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 means that the influence of prejudicial attitudes in the jury 
may largely nullify the progressive intentions of this legislation. Potential measures to 
counter these negative social attitudes about rape are considered. However, it is argued that 
the deliberative process is an inadequate safeguard against prejudicial decision-making and 
that other measures, such as juror education, may be of limited efficacy. This thesis 
concludes that lay participation should be removed from the decision-making process in 
rape trials and replaced by a specialised judge based system. This outcome would be in 
line with the institutional responsibility of the criminal justice system to ensure the 
objective delivery of the law in practice, and that the cost to the complainer of pursing 
justice is not re-victimisation. 
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  1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis reviews the evidence available on the influence of prejudicial social attitudes on 
jury decision-making in rape trials, and considers whether the verdict in rape cases should 
continue to be determined by a jury in Scotland. As elsewhere, in Scotland rape is 
recognised as a form of gender-based violence,1 and the focus of this thesis is upon adult 
female rape by a male perpetrator. 
 
To date, the narrative of rape law and policy reform, transcending jurisdictional 
boundaries, is characterised as a simultaneous story of ‘success’ and ‘failure’. 2  The 
changes exhibit an imbalanced ratio of progressive reform effort to achievement in 
practice, whether in terms of improving low conviction rates3 or reducing the systematic 
re-victimisation experienced by complainers during the legal process.4 Internationally, as 
in Scotland, the legal response to rape remains fraught with difficulty.  
A major issue in rape cases internationally is high attrition, which describes ‘the process 
whereby criminal cases “fail” at some point between the commission of the crime and the 
securing of a conviction’.5 In Scotland, attrition in rape cases is recognised as occurring at 
six defined points.6 The first five stages span from prior to reporting to the police, through 
to the police and prosecutorial investigative and decision-making stages. The sixth and 
final point of attrition is ‘on consideration of the evidence by the jury at the conclusion of a 
trial’.7 Although not the point of attrition at which the statistical majority of rape cases 
‘fail’,8 this final point is critical to both understanding and redressing the current ‘justice 
gap’ for rape victims. The jury acts as the bridge between the law in theory and in practice 
through administering its application, thereby exerting a significant influence upon the 
success of law reform. Furthermore, the return of the verdict impacts not only upon the                                                         
1 S Brindley and M Burman, ‘Meeting the challenge? Responding to rape in Scotland’ in N Westmarland and G 
Ganjoli (eds), International Approaches to Rape (2012) 147; L McMillan, ‘Gender, Crime and Criminal Justice in 
Scotland’ in H Croall, G Mooney and M Munro (eds), Criminal Justice in Scotland (2010) 90 
2 For an overview and variety of national perspectives see C McGlynn and VE Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: 
International and Comparative Perspectives (2011) Intro. and Pt.3; Westmarland and Ganjoli (n 1) 
3 See eg. H Reece, 'Rape Myths: Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?' (2013) 33(3) OJLS 445 at 451 
4 See eg. Burman and Brindley (n 1) at 156-159. The ‘complainer’ is the Scots law term for victim witness, whereas 
the term ‘complainant’ is used in other jurisdictions. For jurisdictional consistency both terms are used in this thesis, 
however where discussing multiple jurisdictions or issues in the abstract, the term ‘complainer’ is preferred. The term 
victim is also used more generally, and acknowledges that an individual can be the victim of rape even though no 
official complaint is made or prosecution brought – for elaboration, see Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
(‘COPFS’), Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006) at para 1.9 
5 COPFS (n 4) at para 2.40 
6 Ibid at para 2.45 
7 Ibid  
8 See M Burman, L Lovett and L Kelly, ‘Different systems, similar outcomes? Tracking attrition in reported rape cases 
in eleven countries: Scotland Country Report’ (2009) 
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individual case but, given the inescapable circularity of the legal response to rape, upon the 
reporting and progression of future cases. 
 
Internationally, juries are more likely to acquit than convict following a rape trial,9 and in 
Scotland, recent statistics continue to show that a jury can be as much as twice as likely to 
acquit than convict on a charge of rape.10 The normative role of the jury is to deliver an 
impartial verdict by reconciling contradictory evidence at trial within the decision criteria 
defined in the law. However, prolonged concerns have been raised in Scotland and 
elsewhere that negative social attitudes towards rape and rape victims – often labelled 
‘rape myths’ – amongst jurors, can unduly influence the outcome of rape trials and result 
in lower conviction rates than objectively indicated by the evidence.11 
 
One recent definition describes rape myths as ‘descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about 
rape (i.e. about its causes, context, consequences, perpetrators, victims and their 
interaction) that serve to deny, downplay or justify sexual violence that men commit 
against women’.12 Whilst the secrecy of deliberations remains a fundamental feature of the 
jury decision-making apparatus, 13  the results of many investigations using a range of 
methodologies continue to implicate the particular sensitivity of rape trials to legally 
irrelevant or inadmissible factors, and a jury decision-making standard infused with rape 
mythology, thereby preventing the return of an impartial verdict. 
 
Reforms to improve rape law and policy have been high on the agenda in Scotland, and a 
portrait of this evolving legal landscape is outlined in chapter 1. The limited impact of the 
reforms is discussed within the context of negative or prejudicial social attitudes about rape 
and rape victims, and the contribution of these to the dissonance between law and practice 
in rape cases. 
 
                                                        
9 L Kelly, J Lovett and L Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases (2005) at 71-72; W Larcombe, 
'Falling Rape Conviction Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for Rape Laws' (2011) 19(1) Fem LS 27 at 32 
10 COPFS (n 4) at para 2.13; COPFS, Conviction Rates for Rape Charges in Scotland Charges Reported: 1 April 2008 
to 31 March 2009, <http://www.copfs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Conviction rates in rape cases 2008-09 - final.doc> 
accessed 30 December 2012 
11 Amongst others see COPFS (n 4); S Cowan 'All Change or Business as Usual? Reforming the Law of Rape in 
Scotland' in McGlynn and Munro, Rethinking Rape Law (n 2) 154, Brindley and Burman (n 1); J Temkin and B 
Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (2008) 
12 G Bohner and others, ‘Rape myth acceptance: Cognitive, affective and behavioural effects of beliefs that blame the 
victim and exonerate the perpetrator’ in MAH Horvath and JM Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary 
Thinking (2009) 17 at 19 
13 In both Scotland, and England and Wales, it is contempt for anyone to obtain, disclose, or solicit any particulars of 
the deliberations in the jury rooms under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 s.8(1) 
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The potential influence of different types of prejudicial social attitudes on juror decision-
making in rape trials, and the extent to which these may negatively impact upon the 
outcome, is considered in detail in chapter 2. The likely interaction between juror attitudes 
and the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 (‘SO(S)A 2009’) is also examined, 
particularly the extent to which prejudicial attitudes in the jury may ultimately undermine 
the intentions of this progressive legislation. 
 
Possible measures to diminish the legal impact of these negative social attitudes amongst 
jurors are considered in chapter 3. The extent to which the deliberative process is an 
inadequate safeguard against biased decision-making is examined and the limited efficacy 
of other measures, such as juror education, is also discussed. 
 
Despite the consensus amongst the Scottish Government, Crown Office and Procurator 
Fiscal Service (‘COPFS’) and victim agencies that negative social attitudes are a key cause 
of the jury’s ‘apparent reluctance’ to convict in rape trials,14 to date no direct consideration 
has been given to the intrinsic appropriateness of the jury as a decision-making forum in 
rape trials in Scotland.15 Accordingly, the question of what normatively makes a decision-
making body appropriate in rape trials is critically reviewed in chapter 4, and the logic and 
legitimacy of continued lay participation in decision-making at trial is questioned. Framed 
against the institutional responsibility of the criminal justice system to ensure the objective 
delivery of the law, and to ensure that the cost of pursuing justice to the complainer is not 
re-victimisation, this thesis puts forward the case for a specialised judge based decision-
making process in rape trials in Scotland.  
                                                        
14 COPFS (n 4) at para 2.28; Scottish Government, Sexual Offences (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum (2008) at 
paras 15-16; Brindley and Burman (no 1) at 162 
15 For brief and generic discussion see The Scottish Government, The Modern Scottish Jury In Criminal Trials (2008). 
For critical commentary see P Duff, ‘The Modern Scottish Jury in Criminal Trials’ (2009) 13 Edin LR 320. For 
specific discussion in context of sexual offending see New Zealand Law Commission (‘NZLC’) Juries in Criminal 
Trials Part One: A Discussion Paper (NZLC PP32, 1998) 
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1. Recent Rape Law Reform in Scotland  
 
Scotland has experienced extensive reform to both the substantive law of rape and 
associated rules of evidence and procedure over the last three decades, with a particular 
increase in measures since devolution in 1999. These progressive changes are outlined and 
their limited success is discussed within the context of negative social attitudes about rape 
and rape victims.  Four categories of these prejudicial attitudes are identified, prior to 
detailed consideration in the following chapter of their potential influence on jury decision-
making. 
 
1.1 Reform Context 
 
1.1(a) Recent Reforms at Trial in Scotland 
 
The impetus behind recent rape law reforms has included the increasing problematisation 
of high attrition and low conviction rates, together with concerns over the traditional 
operation of a very narrow definition of rape in Scots law and the treatment of 
complainers.1  
 
By 2001, many anachronistic and discriminatory features of Scotland’s restrictive 
definition of rape had been removed, largely through judicial innovation. Notable changes 
included ending the requirement for active resistance on the part of the female,2 the marital 
rape exemption3 and the requirement for force.4 This later development simultaneously 
ended the inequitable exclusion of intercourse with a woman who was in a state of extreme 
intoxication, where incapacitated by her own hand or that of a third party, from being 
classified as rape.5  
 
This series of reforms to the traditional definition of rape reached a peak with the 
enactment of the SO(S)A 2009. This Act, underpinned by commitment to the fundamental 
                                                        
1 See eg. COPFS, Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006); Scottish Government, Sexual 
Offences (Scotland) Bill:  Policy Memorandum (2008); Scottish Law Commission (‘SLC’), Report on Rape and 
Other Sexual Offences (Scot Law Com No 209, 2007) 
2 Barbour v HMA 1982 SCCR 195 
3 HMA v Stallard 1989 SCCR 248; for prior decisions partially removing the exemption see HMA v Duffy 1982 SCCR 
182; HMA v Paxton 1984 SCCR 311 
4 Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 of 2001, 2002 SCCR 435 
5 For discussion see PR Ferguson, ‘Corroboration and Sexual Assault in Scots Law’ in M Childs and L Ellison (eds), 
Feminist Perspectives on Evidence (2000) 149 at 149-151 
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principle of respect for individual sexual autonomy,6 firmly cemented Scotland’s doctrinal 
conversion to a response to rape where liability is grounded in the existence of a lack of 
consent. Rape is now statutorily defined as the intentional or reckless penetration, with the 
accused’s penis, of a victim’s vagina, anus or mouth, without the victim’s consent and 
without any reasonable belief that the victim has consented.7  
 
With this reconstruction of the syntax of the substantive definition of rape, rape is no 
longer a gendered crime restricted to female victimisation and vaginal penetration, while 
consent is recast within a more advanced and instructive framework. The consent standard, 
now defined as ‘free agreement’, is re-conceptualised within an active rather than passive 
model.8  
 
Simultaneously, seeking to objectify the law, the requirement that the accused’s belief in 
consent must be reasonable, supplants the previous position whereby Scots law had 
accepted that an accused’s honest belief that a complainer had consented was enough to 
exclude liability for rape, even if the belief was unreasonable in the circumstances.9 That 
the complainer consents only if she agrees freely is reinforced by the requirement that, 
when determining whether or not the accused’s belief is reasonable, consideration be given 
to any particular steps he has taken to ascertain whether she is consenting. 10 Consent 
provisions are further buttressed by the enumeration of a number of factual circumstances, 
which are in themselves constitutive of a lack of consent.11 
 
Further developments in the evidential and procedural arena strengthen the substantive 
focus on consent as a feature of sexual autonomy at trial. Since 2002, cross-examination of 
the complainer by the accused personally has also been disallowed.12 Further, Scotland’s 
first ‘rape shield’ legislation was superseded by the Sexual Offences (Procedure and 
Evidnece) (Scotland) Act 2002 (‘SO(PE)(S) 2002’) s.274, which broadened the scope of 
prohibited evidence, from the more limited focus on sexual history and sexual character 
evidence under its predecessor, to more general character evidence.13 Notably trial judges, 
when exercising their ‘structured discretion’ under s.275 to admit otherwise prohibited                                                         
6 SLC (n 1) at para 1.25; see J Gardner and S Shute, 'The Wrongness of Rape' in J Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence: Fourth Series (2000) 193 
7 SO(S)A 2009 s.1(1) 
8 SLC (n 1) at paras 2.23-2.25 
9 Jamieson v HM Advocate 1994 JC 88 
10 SO(S)A 2009 s.16 
11 SO(S)A 2009 s.13(2)(a)-(f) 
12 Now contained in Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (‘CP(S)A 1995’) s.288C 
13 For discussion see P Duff, 'The Scottish 'rape shield': as good as it gets?' (2011) 15(2) Edin LR 218-242 
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evidence, 14  are now statutorily required to ensure the ‘appropriate protection of the 
complainer’s dignity and privacy’.15 
 
In addition, as a result of victim orientated policies of general application to all criminal 
cases, the complainer may now be eligible to give their testimony through ‘special 
measures’ available for vulnerable witnesses.16 Where available, these supplement existing 
measures including clearing the court in trials on indictment for a sexual offence.17 
 
These substantive and evidential reforms have been further complemented by wider 
improvements in pre-trial case handling, including Scottish Government funding of 
specialist victim services and changes to the way sexual offences are investigated and 
prosecuted.18 These developments represent a shift towards an increasingly specialised and 
collaborative response to sexual offending. 
 
1.1(b) Limitations of Reform 
 
These reforms in Scotland have broadly mirrored developments in other jurisdictions. In 
Scotland, as internationally, the recurrent theme has been that the ‘successes’ of reform, 
through the progressive transformation of substantive rape law, evidential rules and policy, 
have often been neutralised at the level of practice.19 As commentators identify, ‘if any 
area of the law illustrates the limitations of a law reform process it has to be sexual 
assault’.20 
 
While some reforms in Scotland are relatively recent in comparison to many other 
jurisdictions, international doubts over the ability of law reform to make a significant 
                                                        
14 Ibid at 226 
15 Now contained in CP(S)A 1995 S.275(1)(c) and s.275(2)(b)(i) respectively 
16 Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004 (‘VW(S)A 2004’) s.1 and s.18, inserting CP(S)A1995 s.271 and s.271H 
respectively; for text and commentary see L Sharp and ML Ross, The Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004 
(2008) 
17 CP(S)A 1995 s.92(3) 
18 For discussion see S Brindley and M Burman, ‘Meeting the challenge? Responding to rape in Scotland’ in N 
Westmarland and G Ganjoli (eds), International Approaches to Rape (2012) 147 at 155-162. As a result of parallel 
internal reviews of procedures, policy and practice, see Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (‘ACPOS’) 
Scottish Investigators’ Guide to Serious Sexual Offences (2008) and COPFS (n 1). The COPFS implemented 50 
recommendations by June 2009 
19 Amongst others see C McGlynn, ‘Feminist activism and rape law reform in England and Wales: a Sisyphean 
struggle?’ in C McGlynn and VE Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives 
(2011) 139; S Cowan, 'All Change or Business as Usual? Reforming the Law of Rape in Scotland' in McGlynn and 
Munro (n 19) 154; LH Schafran and J Weinberger, ‘Impressive progress alongside persistent problems': rape law, 
policy and practice in the United States’ in Westmarland and Ganjoli (n 18) 193; RA Fenton, ‘Rape in Italian law: 
towards the recognition of sexual autonomy’ in McGlynn and Munro (n 19) 183 
20 R Graycar and J Morgan, 'Law Reform: What's in it for Women?' (2005) 23 WYAJ 393 at 410 
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difference in practice, 21  are reflected in Cowan’s prediction that, even in post-reform 
Scotland, it will remain ‘business as usual’.22 
 
1.1(c) Conviction Rates 
 
Persistently low conviction rates for rape are often deployed as a measure of the limited 
effectiveness of the criminal justice response to rape.23 Thus, internationally the limitations 
of extensive reforms are typically presented in terms of their perceived inability to increase 
rape conviction rates.24  
 
The emergent pattern over the last decades, both internationally and in Scotland, has been 
that the number of reported rapes has increased dramatically, but has not been 
accompanied by an equivalent rise in prosecutions and convictions.25 This increase in the 
reporting of rape has therefore precipitated a diminishing conviction rate as a proportion of 
offences reported, from around 20% in 1977 to around 3% in Scotland, and a ‘justice gap’ 
at its widest.26 In Scotland, even with the continuous rise in recorded reports of rape,27 for 
example, currently less than a quarter of rapes disclosed to Rape Crisis Scotland (‘RCS’) 
are subsequently reported to the police.28 The indication that the increase in reported rapes 
results from an improved response to rape, is also diluted by the fact that the increase is 
partly attributable to the redistribution of sub-categories of sexual offences as rape, 
resulting from the widening definition of rape. 
 
The conviction rate for rape at trial in Scotland has remained relatively static over the last 
three decades29 and continues to be approximately 26-33% of those rape charges indicted 
                                                        
21 See generally McGlynn and Munro (n 19) at Pt. 3 
22 Cowan (n 19) at 154-166 
23 For commentary see W Larcombe, 'Falling Rape Conviction Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for Rape 
Laws' (2011) 19(1) Fem LS 27 at 27-31 
24 Ibid. See eg. I Seidman & S Vickers, ‘The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law 
Reform’ (2005) 38 SUL Rev 467-492 at 467-468 
25 M Burman, L Lovett and L Kelly, ‘Different systems, similar outcomes? Tracking attrition in reported rape cases in 
eleven countries: Scotland Country Report’ (2009) at 3-5. More recent statistics for the years to 2010 for the numbers 
of cases reported, prosecuted ad convicted in Scotland continue to follow the same pattern – COPFS, Conviction 
Rates for Rape Charges in Scotland Charges Reported: 1 April 2008 to 31 March 2009, 
<http://www.copfs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Conviction rates in rape cases 2008-09 - final.doc> accessed 30 
December 2012 
26 Burman, Lovett and Kelly (n 25) at 4; L Kelly, J Lovett and L Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape 
Cases (2005) at 89; J Temkin and B Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (2008) at 10 
27 For recent data see Scottish Government, Recorded Crime in Scotland, 2012-13 (2013) 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0042/00425429.pdf> Accessed 30th July 2013 at 31 
28 Rape Crisis Scotland (‘RCS’), Rape Crisis Scotland Annual Report 2012 
<http://www.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/workspace/uploads/files/annualreport12.pdf> accessed 30 July 2013 at 17 
29 Burman, Lovett and Kelly (n 25) at 5 
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at trial.30 As Scotland has experienced substantive law reform later than most countries, the 
conviction statistics reported predate the implementation of the SO(S)A 2009. It may 
therefore be easy to use the later reform as an explanatory factor in the low conviction rate, 
and to anticipate future improvement. Indeed, initial reports stated a conviction rate of 62% 
for rape under the SO(S)A 2009.31 However, the implication that the conviction rate has 
increased under the new legislation is likely to be misleading, given it was derived from 
only thirteen concluded prosecutions and it might reasonably be suggested that these were 
the strongest cases.32  
 
Indeed, the less optimistic picture painted by international comparison legitimises such 
cynicism. For example, England has experienced similar evidential reforms and the 
enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (‘SOA 2003’), yet all the measures combined 
have achieved disappointing results in terms of improving low convictions rates. 33 
Similarly, a comparative study of the USA, Australia, Canada, Scotland and England, 
found that where countries have initiated legal reform earlier, this does not consistently 
correspond to that country exhibiting higher overall conviction rates than countries that 
have initiated reform at a later stage.34  
 
In Scotland, as elsewhere, the conviction rate at trial remains an issue on the basis that rape 
charges exhibit the lowest conviction rate amongst comparable sexual and non-sexual 
offences against the person by significant margins.35 Equally, it has been suggested in 
England, that even if attrition and conviction rates for other offences were on a par, the 
salient point is that ‘when we look at the ratio of reform effort to reform achievement in 
relation to convictions, rape has indeed fared badly’.36 The fact that rape conviction rates 
have declined or remained static, despite the range of reforms, has been dubbed an 
international paradox.37 
                                                        
30 COPFS (n 1) at para 2.13; COPFS (n 25) at 4. This does not include where the accused is found guilty or has pled 
guilty to an alternative sexual charge, adding between a further 1-9% 
31  See COPFS, ‘Lord Advocate announces 62% Rape Conviction Rate under new Sex Offences Legislation’ (2 
December 2011) <http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/media-site/media-releases/203-lord-advocate-announces-62-rape-
conviction-rate-under-new-sex-offences-legislation> accessed 30 July 2013 
32 Indeed, it is probable that simple cases and cases where the accused plead guilty were the first cases to be concluded 
under the new legislation 
33 J Temkin, ‘"And Always Keep A-Hold of Nurse, For Fear of Finding Something Worse": Challenging Rape Myths in 
the Courtroom’ (2010) 13(4) New Crim L Rev 710 at 712; H Reece, 'Rape Myths: Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular 
Opinion Wrong?' (2013) 33(3) OJLS 445 at 451 
34 K Daly and B Bouhours, ‘Rape and attrition in the legal process: A comparative analysis of five countries’ (2010) 
39(1) Crime and Justice 565 at 579 
35 In Scotland see L McMillan, ‘Gender, Crime and Criminal Justice in Scotland’ in H Croall, G Mooney and M Munro 
(eds), Criminal Justice in Scotland (2010) 90 at 102-103; for England see Temkin and Krahé (n 26) at 19-21 
36 Reece (n 33) at 451 
37 Kelly, Lovett and Regan (n 26) at 30 
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1.1(d) Re-victimisation 
 
Conviction rates provide a powerful context through which to understand the impetus 
behind legal developments and the limitations of reforms to date. That said, too confined a 
focus on conviction rates as a measure of effectiveness of criminal justice processes, or as 
a sole criterion by which to designate the reform process a success or failure, is difficult. 
Conviction rates provide only one dimensional quantitative data, and even then are 
difficult to compare given the inherent variability in methodologies and recording practices 
both between and within jurisdictions.  
 
The dominance of conviction rates in socio-legal discourses on rape internationally38 is 
increasingly problematised within a growing recognition of the need to look beyond to 
associated measures, such as qualitative and victim-centered outcomes.39  
 
Internationally, the treatment of rape complainers and the trauma of participating in the 
justice system has been widely condemned, and many complainer oriented procedural 
reforms introduced.40 Yet, across international research considering the ratio of law reform 
effort to achievement from the complainer’s perspective, the uninterrupted finding remains 
that assuming the role of complainer results in a ‘second’ or ’courtroom rape’.41 In the 
1980s research into the prosecution of sexual offences in Scotland documented that 
complainers felt ‘on trial as much as the accused’.42 This problem remains acute even after 
over two decades of reform.43 The qualitative information available highlights a ‘startling 
“disconnect”’ between legislative and policy ambition and reality,44 and ‘the courtroom 
remains a site of secondary victimisation’.45 
 
                                                         
38 For discussion see Larcombe (n 23) at 29 
39 Amongst others see Larcombe (n 23); C Stern, The Stern Review: An Independent review into how rape complaints 
are handled by public authorities in England and Wales (2010); F Raitt, ‘Independent legal representation for 
complainers in sexual offence trials: research report for Rape Crisis Scotland’ (2010) 
<http://ww.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/workspace/publications/IndLegalRepReport-2010.pdf> accessed 29 July 2013 
40 J Jordan, ‘Silencing rape, silencing women’ in JM Brown and S Walklate (eds), Handbook of Sexual Violence (2011) 
253 at 265-269 
41 Ibid; Z Adler, Rape on Trial (1987) 
42 G Chambers and A Millar, ‘Proving Sexual Assault: Prosecuting the Offender or Persecuting the Victim?’ in A 
Worral and P Carlen (eds) Gender, Crime and Justice (1987) 58 
43 SLC (n 1) at paras 2.13 and 6.24; M Burman, ‘Evidencing Sexual Assault: Women in the witness box’ (2009) 56(4) 
Probation Journal 1 
44 Raitt (n 39) at para 1.07; see also M Burman and others, Impact of Aspects of the Law of Evidence in Sexual Offence 
Trials: An Evaluation Study (2007) 
45 Brindley and Burman (n 18) at 159 
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1.2 Social Attitudes 
 
A major factor increasingly identified as fundamental in the failure to make progress in 
either improving convictions rates or reducing the re-victimisation of complainers, is the 
influence of negative or prejudicial social attitudes in this area of law.46  
 
There exists a broad consensus that negative social attitudes towards rape and rape victims 
continue to contribute to the disjuncture between the theory and praxis of ‘reform’.47 
Irrespective of shortcomings in the law and policy changes and their implementation, 
social attitudes continue to pose a determinative ‘real world’ obstacle to the success of 
reform.48 Legal doctrine and policy is reliant on human agency for execution, and as Reece 
summarises:  
The suggestion that judicial interpretation has undermined progressive 
legislation amounts to a complaint about judges’ attitudes; a concern with the 
vagueness of legislation comes down to worries about jurors’ attitudes; and 
criticism of failures in implementation and enforcement equates to dismay at 
the attitudes of criminal justice system agents.49  
 
Indeed, varying the orthodox explanation that the unique difficultly in securing rape 
convictions is posed by a deficit of extrinsic evidence, the emerging argument is that, ‘it is 
not necessarily the lack of evidence that matters but the attitude towards the evidence that 
matters’.50 Within this re-conceptualisation, the concern is that juries, representative of 
popular prejudice, continue to essentially nullify the legislature’s ostensible prohibition of 
all non-consensual sexual intercourse, thus operating as a limiting factor in the success of 
law reform internationally.51 
 
Negative social attitudes exist at individual and societal level, and are reproduced at 
institutional level to the extent that they are held by agents throughout the justice system.52 
These attitudes can mean complainers of rape continue to experience secondary 
                                                        
46 Amongst others see Temkin and Krahé (n 26); COPFS (n 1); Cowan (n 19); Jordan (n 40) 
47 See eg. Temkin and Krahé (n 26); N Westmarland, ‘Still little justice for rape victim survivors: the void between 
policy and practice in England and Wales’ in Westmarland and Ganjoli (n 18) 79; Schafran and Weinberger (n 19) 
48 See eg. Burman (n 43); Cowan (n 19); Westmarland (n 47); McGlynn (n 19) 
49 Reece (n 33) at 452 
50 Temkin and Krahé (n 26) at 209 
51 See eg. D Dripps, ‘After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault’ (2008) 
41 Akron L Rev 957 
52 MW Stewart, SA Dobbin and SI Gatowski, ‘‘‘Real Rapes’’ and ‘‘Real Victims’’: The Shared Reliance on Common 
Cultural Definitions of Rape’ (1996) 4(2) Fem LS 159 at 162; Temkin and Krahé (n 26) at 171-172 
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victimisation through individual and institutional responses to their complaint, which 
disqualify their experience as rape victims and exacerbate their trauma.  
 
Social attitudes are recognised as a key cause of the high attrition in rape cases, and 
identified as contributing to attrition where victims do not report 53  and at police and 
prosecutorial decision-making stages.54  
 
Whilst ‘rape myths’ are recognised as a problem ubiquitous to the legal process 
surrounding allegations of rape, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate specifically the 
role of negative or prejudicial social attitudes where attrition occurs ‘on consideration of 
the evidence by the jury at the conclusion of a trial’. In anticipation of this examination, 
these attitudes are described here in terms of four categories. 
 
1.2(a) ‘Women Cry Rape’ Myths 
 
This frequently identified category of rape myths, that ‘women cry rape’, includes views 
which express a general disbelief in claims of rape,55 and as a corollary a belief in the high 
frequency of false allegations. This may signify a belief that women fabricate entire 
allegations, or lie about specific incidences that were actually consensual.  
 
The prevalence of the apparent mistrust of or scepticism towards rape allegations is 
illustrated, for example, by the results of attitudinal surveys in the UK and Ireland which 
indicate between 18-45% of the public express a belief either that accusations of rape are 
‘often false’, or that the ‘majority’ of claims of rape are ‘probably not true’, or ‘false’.56 
Whilst there may be both limitations to the robustness of the findings from these types of 
abstract attitudinal surveys and methodological difficulties in establishing the actual rate of 
false allegations,57 the results contrast with data indicating that only 4% of rape reports are                                                         
53 Social attitudes can prevent women’s self-identification as victims of rape - see A Myhill and J Allen, Rape and 
Sexual Assault of Women: The Extent and Nature of the Problem (2002) at 53; or deter victims from reporting see 
COPFS (n 1) at para 2.8; L Regan and L Kelly, Rape: Still a Forgotten Issue (2003) at 8. 
54 For a summary see Temkin and Krahé (n 26) at 38-41; Kelly and others (n 26); SJ Lea, U Lanvers and S Shaw, 
‘Attrition in rape cases. Developing a profile and identifying relevant factors’ (2003) 43(3) BJ Crim 583; Stewart, 
Dobbin and Gatowski (n 52); for research specifically in Scotland see G Chambers and A Millar, Investigating Sexual 
Assault (1983) 
55 G Bohner and others, ‘Rape myth acceptance: Cognitive, affective and behavioural effects of beliefs that blame the 
victim and exonerate the perpetrator’ in MAH Horvath and JM Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary 
Thinking (2009) 17 at 19 
56  H McGee and others, ‘Rape and Child Sexual Abuse What Beliefs Persist About Motives, Perpetrators, and 
Survivors?’ (2011) 26(17) J Interpers Violence 3580; Opinion Matters, Wake Up to Rape Research Summary Report 
(prepared for The Havens (Sexual Assault Referral Centres)) (2010); C Withey, ‘Rape and Sexual Assault Education: 
Where is the law?’ (2010) 13(4) New Crim L Rev 802 respectively 
57 Abstract attitudinal surveys are open to the subjective interpretation of terminology such as ‘often’ or ‘false’ see eg. 
Reece (n 33) at 459-461 
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designated as ‘false’ in Scotland.58 Similarly, two research studies of attrition patterns 
across Europe have indicated that there is no evidence that the scale of false reporting in 
rape cases is higher than for other crimes.59  
 
The persistence of the disparity between public attitudes about the extent of false 
allegations of rape and the actual levels, has meant that, as Norfolk surmises, ‘[f]or no 
other offence is there so much controversy about the level of false allegations’.60  
 
Yet beliefs in high levels of false allegations can be juxtaposed against the reality of a 
‘culture of silence’ surrounding instances of rape. 61 Internationally, women more typically 
minimise their experiences of coercive sexual intercourse and most rapes are never 
reported. 62  In Scotland, this paradox is captured in the finding that 41% of a cross section 
of the public agreed that more men are being falsely accused of rape now than ever before, 
despite the fact that 54% felt that more rapes go unreported now than ever before. 63 
 
1.2(b) ‘Real Rape’ Myths 
 
Another frequently identified category of rape myths is based upon a belief in ‘real rape’. 
‘Real rape’ depicts ‘an attack by a stranger on an unsuspecting victim in an outdoor 
location, involving the use or threat of force by the assailant and active physical resistance 
by the victim’, whereby the victim promptly reports the incident to the police and is visibly 
emotional and upset about the experience.64 This rape myth can represent a descriptive 
belief that ‘real rape’ is the norm, a prescriptive belief in what constitutes a genuine rape 
allegation or a belief in gradation in the seriousness of rape.65 
 
As a descriptive belief, the ‘real rape’ construct is irreconcilable with the available factual 
information regarding the circumstantial profile of rape cases in both Scotland and 
internationally. 66  For example, in Scotland the overwhelming majority of rapes are                                                         
58 Burman, Lovett and Kelly (n 25) at 9 
59 See L Kelly, ‘The (in) credible words of women: false allegations in European rape research’ (2010) 16(12) Violence 
Against Women 1345 
60 GA Norfolk, ‘Leda and the Swan–And other myths about rape’ (2011) 18(5) J Forensic Leg Med 225 at 231 
61 Westmarland (n 47) at 95; Jordan (n 40) at 259-262 
62 Jordan (n 40) at 259-260 
63 B Cameron and L Murphy, Campaign Evaluation Report Rape Crisis Scotland “This is not an invitation to Rape 
Me”: Research Report (2008) at 13 
64 Temkin and Krahé (n 36) at 31. For the origins of the term, see S Estrich, Real Rape (1987) 
65 Amongst others see Temkin and Krahé (n 26) at 31-33; B Krahé and A Berger, ‘A Social-Cognitive Perspective on 
Attrition Rates in Sexual Assault Cases’ in ME Oswald, S Bieneck and J Hupfeld-Heinemann (eds), Social 
Psychology of Punishment and Crime (2009) 335 
66 Burman, Lovett and Kelly (n 25) at 6, D Lievore, Non-reporting and hidden recording of sexual assault: An 
international literature review (2003) 
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perpetrated by an acquaintance, occur in an indoor private space and do not result in the 
victim sustaining physical injury.67 
 
As a prescriptive belief, real rape influences an individual’s subjective definition of ‘what 
rape looks like’. For example, a recent survey documented that 10% of respondents ‘do not 
believe it is rape when a man makes their partner have sex when they don’t want to’.68 
Furthermore across various studies, the suspicion with which acquaintance or partner rapes 
are viewed is reflected in study participants’ decreased certainty that a rape has occurred.69  
Another study documented that 30-45% of respondents ‘did not know that rape occurs 
even though a women does not fight back or say “no”’.70  
 
The prescriptive manifestation of the ‘real rape’ belief is viewed as particularly 
problematic, as it results in the creation of a template standard against which the credibility 
of claims of rape are judged at societal and institutional level. 71  This reflects a mis-
statement of law and is also as odds with empirical reality. One illustration of this is that, 
as a conscious or unconscious coping mechanism, many rape victims do not show visible 
signs of emotional distress post-assault. An acutely calm emotional demeanor, or 
‘emotional numbing’, is one of the defining exhibits of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
which is frequently experienced by rape victims.72 
 
The ‘real rape’ myth can also represent a belief in a gradation within rape. Evidence 
suggests a general perception that rapes conforming with the paradigm are more serious 
than other rapes. 73  For example, even where an assault by an acquaintance may be 
accepted as constituting rape, individuals may perceive acquaintance rape as less serious 
than stranger rape, and estimate a less important trauma for victims.74 Legally there is no 
gradation within rape, and this belief is empirically counterfactual. All victims of rape are 
                                                        
67 Burman, Lovett and Kelly (n 25) at 6; COPFS (n 1) at para 2.30 
68 Opinion Matters (n 56) at 8 
69 B Krahé, J Temkin and S Bieneck, ‘Schemadriven information processing in judgments about rape’ (2007) 21(5) 
Applied Cognitive Psychology 601; GT Viki, D Abrams and B Masser, ‘Evaluating Stranger and Acquaintance Rape’ 
(2004) 28(3) Law and Human Behavior 295 
70 Withey (n 56) at 813 
71 Temkin and Krahé (n 26) at 31-33 
72 EB Foa and BO Rothbaum, Treating the Trauma of Rape: Cognitive-behavioral Therapy for PTSD (2001); J Petrak 
and B Hedge, The Trauma of Sexual Assault: Treatment, Prevention and Practice (2002) 
73 S Bieneck and B Krahé, ‘Blaming the Victim and Exonerating the Perpetrator in Cases of Rape and Robbery: Is there 
a Double Standard?’ (2011) 25 J Interpers Violence 1785 at 1786 
74 S Ben-David and O Schneider, ‘Rape perceptions, gender role attitudes, and victim-perpetrator acquaintance’ (2005) 
53(5-6) Sex Roles 385; B Frese, M Moya and JL Megías, ‘ Social Perception of Rape How Rape Myth Acceptance 
Modulates the Influence of Situational Factors’ (2004) 19(2) J Interpers Violence 143; A Clarke, J Moran-Ellis and J 
Sleney, Attitudes to Date Rape and Relationship Rape: A Qualitative Study (2002) 
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equally vulnerable to the development of trauma symptoms, 75  with some clinical 
experience documenting that women raped by non-strangers experience a more difficult 
psychological recovery.76 
 
1.2(c) Victim Precipitation Myths 
 
This identified category of rape myths, includes beliefs which assign a precipitory role to 
the victim for their victimisation, perceiving the woman as responsible and/or 
blameworthy for her victimisation. 77 As commentators describe, ‘there is probably no 
other criminal offence that is as intimately related to broader social attitudes and 
evaluations of the victim’s conduct as sexual assault’.78 Gender-role and sexist attitudes 
are regarded as attitudinal antecedents of responsibility and blame attributions. 79 
Behaviours identified as increasing attributions of responsibility or blame to the victim are 
consistently indicated to be behaviours which might be regarded as exceeding female 
gender-role expectations.80  
 
Recent research conducted with a cross section of the Scottish public documented that, 
whilst a contingent of the participants agreed that women are never to blame for being 
raped, the majority considered a victim to have ‘increased her risk of rape’ through, for 
example, her behavior or dress and a further 23% outwardly subscribed to the premise that 
woman are ‘asking for it’ by behaving in certain ways.81 These core ‘blamers’ existed 
across the sample and were not distinct to age group or gender.82 
 
Similarly, for example, an Amnesty International survey found that significant proportions 
of the public – varying between over a fifth and over a third – believed that women were 
‘totally’ or ‘partially’ responsible for their sexual victimisation in numerous circumstances. 
These included where the woman has been drinking, is wearing revealing clothing, is alone 
and walking in a dangerous or deserted area, has failed to clearly say ‘no’, has behaved in a                                                         
75 MP Koss, ‘Rape: Scope, impact, interventions, and public policy response’ (1993) 48(10) American Psychologist 
1062 at 1064 
76 SI Bowie and others, ‘Blitz Rape and Confidence Rape: Implications for Clinical Intervention’ (1990) 64 American 
Journal of Psychotherapy 180 at 184-185; G Gidycz and MP Koss, ‘The Effects of Acquaintance Rape on the Female 
Victim’ in A Parrot and L Bechhofer (eds), Acquaintance Rape: The Hidden Crime (1991) 270 
77 G Bohner and others (n 55) at 19 
78 Temkin and Krahé (n 26) at 33 
79 Frese, Moya and Megías (n 74) at 156 
80 For a number of reviews of the evidence to this effect, see Temkin and Krahé (n 26) at 41-48; A Grubb and E Turner, 
‘Attribution of blame in rape cases: A review of the impact of rape myth acceptance, gender role conformity and 
substance use on victim blaming (2012) 17(5) Aggression and Violent Behavior 443; P Pollard, ‘Judgments about 
victims and attackers in depicted rapes: a review’ (1992) 31 Brit J Soc Psychol 307 
81 Cameron and Murphy (n 63) at 11 
82 Ibid 
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flirtatious manner or has a reputation for having had multiple sexual partners. 83 These 
findings have been largely replicated in the subsequent Wake Up to Rape Report84 and in 
Scotland, a survey carried out by TNS.85 The former of these disclosed that nearly two 
thirds of respondents attribute responsibility for the rape to a victim who has drunk 
excessively or to ‘blackout’, with this escalating to nearly three quarters where the victim 
has performed another sexual act with the perpetrator.86 
 
Across all three surveys, the use of ‘responsible’ may indicate that either respondents 
meant that the victim was to blame, with research supporting that in practice people use the 
concepts of blame and responsibility interchangeably,87 or that the victim was causally 
implicated in the rape, essentially she had ‘increased her risk of rape’.88  
 
An emerging body of research specifically documents this later type of belief as 
representing a more subtle subscription to victim precipitation myths than explicit victim 
blaming, and a more covert expression of negative attitudes toward rape victims.89 Thus: 
Although those rape myths that blatantly blame girls and women for rape have 
become less acceptable, many of the underlying beliefs that the girls and 
women did something to contribute to the assault and that it is not completely 
the perpetrator’s fault still exist but in more covert expressions.90 
 
A belief in victim precipitation signifies distorted views of the antecedents of rape,91 and is 
unethical given ‘it is the perpetrator who decides to commit a sexual assault regardless of 
the victim’s behavior and the responsibility must remain with them’.92 
 
1.2(d) Consent Myths 
 
The final category of rape myths described here, ‘consent myths’, can be closely related to 
the victim precipitation myths discussed above, but focus on a notion of implied consent                                                         
83 ICM, Sexual Assault Research Summary Report (prepared for Amnesty International) (2005)   
84 Opinion Matters (n 56) 
85 TNS System Three, Findings from the Wave 10 Post-campaign Evaluation of the Domestic Abuse Campaign 2006/07 
(2007) 
86 Opinion Matters (n 56) at 9 
87 See C Cameron and W Stritzke, ‘Alcohol and Acquaintance Rape in Australia: Testing the Presupposition Model of 
Attributions of Responsibility and Blame’ (2003) 33(5) J App Soc Psychol 983 
88 Reece (n 33) at 469 
89 KM Edwards and others, ‘Rape Myths: History, Individual and Institutional-Level Presence, and Implications for 
Change’ (2011) 65(11-12) Sex Roles 761 at 769; S McMahon, ‘Rape Myth Beliefs and Bystander Attitudes Among 
Incoming College Students’ (2011) 59(1) Journal of American College Health 3 at 4-5 
90 McMahon (n 89) at 5 
91 Bohner and others (n 55) at 18 
92 J Lovett and MAH Horvath, ‘Alcohol and drugs in rape and sexual assault’ in Horvath and Brown (n 55) 125 at 155 
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and socio-sexual conventions; or ‘playing the rules of the game’. 93 The nature of the 
distinction means that some participants in public survey results may have been equating 
‘responsible’ with a form of consent based in social conventions. This includes beliefs that 
certain behaviors, such as a victim’s attire or shared alcohol consumption, are indicative of 
implied consent to sexual intercourse thereafter.94   
 
Even if certain social behaviours may be perceived as conventions for consent to sexual 
intercourse in certain contexts,95 the Scottish Law Commission (‘SLC’) has made the case 
that: 
[S]erious questions arise whether there are in fact conventions of this type 
which are accepted and understood by all the parties whose actings are to be 
interpreted by them. In the absence of such shared acceptances of the 
conventions, any inference that a person is playing by the rules of the 
conventions cannot be drawn. Indeed there are good reasons to suppose that 
some of these conventions reflect a one-sided, partial view of sexuality.96  
 
1.3 Assessing Social Attitudes 
 
The types of opinion surveys cited in describing the categories of rape myths, are good 
indicators of the prejudicial social attitudes held by some individuals in the population 
towards rape and rape victims. This often leads to these survey results being used as 
evidence of why juries may be ‘reluctant to convict’ in rape cases, on the basis that it is 
reasonable to believe that identified social attitudes in the population will be replicated 
amongst jurors as a microcosm of society.97  However, there are a range of limitations to 
attitudinal survey results that weaken this conclusion. 
 
On one hand, these surveys may fail to capture the full prevalence of beliefs, with 
researchers acknowledging that individuals may be aware increasingly of the socially 
‘appropriate’ or politically correct attitudes. 98  Consequently, ‘the absence of an                                                         
93 SLC (n 1) at para 2.8 
94 See eg. RA Schuller and A Wall, ‘Sexual Assault and Defendant/Victim Intoxication: Jurors’ Perceptions of Guilt’ 
(2000) 30(2) J Appl Soc Psychol 253; A Abbey and R Harnish, ‘Perceptions of Sexual Intent: The Role of Gender, 
Alcohol Consumption and Rape Supportive Attitudes’ (1995) 32 Sex Roles 297; SLC (n 1) at para 2.9 
95 See Reece (n 33) at 462-466 
96 SLC (n 1) at para 2.9 
97 See eg. COPFS (n 1) at para 2.28-2.36 
98 L Ellison and VE Munro, ‘A Stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room? Critical Reflections Upon 
Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study’ (2010) 13(4) New Crim L Rev 781; H Gerger and 
others, ‘The Acceptance of Modern Myths About Sexual Aggression Scale: Development and Validation in German 
and English’ (2007) 33(5) Aggressive Behavior 422 at 424; Edwards and others (n 89) at 769 
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individual’s self reported endorsement of a belief does not necessarily mean that that the 
person does not implicitly hold that belief or that the individual’s behaviour is not 
influenced by such cultural beliefs.’99   
 
However, more importantly, there are significant limitations to the extent to which these 
surveys are instructive within the context of the jury.  There exists a complex interaction 
between an individual’s attitudes in the abstract situation of a survey and the specific 
details of a court case, along with the relevant legal tests, burdens of proof and the jury’s 
deliberative process.100 The difficulty is in ascertaining whether and how the attributions of 
responsibility and/or blame implicit in rape myths might negatively impact upon the 
jurors’ verdict, when knowing what individuals meant can be obscured by the lack of 
context in attitudinal surveys and of course, when the respondents are not being asked to 
determine a verdict in a specific case.  However, it has been found that in some 
circumstances, when charged with determining the guilt of the defendant beyond 
reasonable doubt in a specific case, the wider attitudes held by individuals can amplify ‘to 
be harsher on the complainant and more sympathetic toward the defendant than their 
responses to rape myth acceptance surveys may suggest’.101 
 
A key problem is that the secrecy of jury deliberations essentially precludes obtaining 
evidence of the influence of social attitudes amongst jurors in individual rape cases. 102  
However, there is a wealth of experimental research literature which shows that negative 
social attitudes are a powerful force in rape trials. The finding that the rape-related 
attitudes held by jurors impacts upon case-based decision-making is almost fully supported 
by the available research literature, including that conducted in the UK.103 Indeed, it is 
considered that juror judgments in rape trials continue to be influenced more by the 
attitudes, beliefs and biases about rape which they hold prior to entering the courtroom, 
than by the objective facts presented.104                                                         
99 Edwards and others (n 89) at 769 
100 Ellison and Munro (n 98) at 799 
101 Ibid at 793 
102 E Finch and VE Munro, ‘Breaking boundaries? Sexual consent in the jury room’ (2006) 26(3) LS 303 at 309; C 
McGlynn and VE Munro ‘Rethinking Rape Law: An Introduction’ in McGlynn and Munro (n 19) 1 at 13 
103 For a review of the literature see C Cunliffe and others, ‘Do rape myths affect juror decision making? A systematic 
review of the literature.’ (A BPP University College School of Health/Professional Development Working Paper, 
November 2012) < http://www.bpp.com/carbon-content-1.0-
SNAPSHOT/resources/ECMDocument?contentName=Rape_myths_Dec_2012> Accessed 30 July 2013 
104 N Taylor and J Joudo, The impact of pre-recorded video and closed circuit television testimony by adult sexual 
assault complainants on jury decision-making: an experimental study (2005); N Taylor, Juror attitudes and biases in 
sexual assault cases (2007); Ellison and Munro (n 97); for older studies demonstrating that juror adherence to rape 
myths correlated more strongly with a verdict than the objective evidence about the case see G LaFree, Rape and 
Criminal Justice: The Social Construction of Sexual Assault (1989); HS Field, ’Juror background characteristics and 
attitudes toward rape’ (1978) 2(2) Law and Human Behavior 73; HS Feild and LB Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study 
in Psychology and Law (1980) 
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This potential influence of the different types of prejudicial social attitudes identified in 
this chapter on juror decision-making in rape trials, and the extent to which these may 
negatively impact upon the outcome, is examined in chapter 2. 
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2. The Influence of Juror Attitudes in Rape Trials 
 
The potential influence of social attitudes upon juror decision-making in rape trials, and 
the extent to which these may negatively impact upon the outcome, is examined in this 
chapter. The decision-making context of rape trials is explored through a discussion of the 
potential effect of juror attitudes upon conviction rates, in addition to concerns over jurors’ 
understanding and attentiveness to the law and assessments of complainer credibility. This 
is followed by an analysis of the deleterious impact of the four different types of 
prejudicial social attitudes identified in chapter 1 upon juror decision-making. A key issue 
identified is the extent to which juror attitudes are likely to undermine the progressive 
intent of the SO(S)A 2009. 
 
Whilst there is concern that the scope of juror secrecy precludes obtaining definitive 
evidence of the malign impact of negative social attitudes in individual rape trials,1 an 
expanding body of experimental research literature, in particular that conducted with mock 
jurors, provides invaluable insight and removes the jury’s immunity from criticism. 
 
2.1 Decision-Making Context 
 
2.1(a) Potential Effect on Conviction Rates 
 
The international consensus is that juries are more likely to acquit than convict following a 
rape trial.2 Similarly, in Scotland, despite the fact that prosecution is only pursued where 
there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the indictment for rape, recent data from 2006-
2009 shows that the jury is more likely to acquit than convict upon a charge of rape.3 The 
jury continue to return a verdict of guilty in approximately 20% of cases indicted for rape.4 
This mirrors earlier findings in 2002-2003, where only 19% of adult rape charges 
                                                          
1 See eg. E Finch and VE Munro, ‘Breaking boundaries? Sexual consent in the jury room’ (2006) 26(3) LS 303 at 309. 
For criticism of the principle of juror confidentiality as too absolutist in preventing research into how juries conduct 
themselves – see PR Ferguson, ‘The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the 
investigation of impropriety’ (2006) 10(3) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 180 at 210. Although for the 
view that jury secrecy is less of an impediment to research than commonly assumed, see C Thomas, Are Juries Fair? 
(2010) at 1 
2 L Kelly, J Lovett and L Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases (2005) at 71-72; W Larcombe, 
'Falling Rape Conviction Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for Rape Laws' (2011) 19(1) Fem LS 27 at 32 
3 Through the combination of the Not Guilty and Not Proven verdicts 
4 COPFS, Conviction Rates for Rape Charges in Scotland Charges Reported: 1 April 2008 to 31 March 2009, 
<http://www.copfs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Conviction rates in rape cases 2008-09 - final.doc> accessed 30 
December 2012 
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prosecuted resulted in the jury returning a Guilty verdict;5 a figure of under half of the 
acquittals delivered.6  
 
The inclusion of a Not Proven verdict within the Scottish jury’s unique tripartite of 
verdicts, has been viewed as particularly problematic within the rape context on the basis 
that it is most commonly returned in rape and sexual assault cases. 7  However, other 
jurisdictions, which operate the more conventional Not Guilty/Guilty binary, still exhibit 
similarly high acquittal rates at trial. Furthermore, as will be discussed both internationally 
and in Scotland, analyses of conviction patterns have demonstrated that those cases which 
do result in conviction are more likely to reflect stereotypes of rape.8 
 
Recent research in England documented a jury conviction rate of 54% in rape cases 
involving female complainants that progressed to trial.9 Therefore, the authors stated that, 
contrary to a previous assessment, juries actually convict more often than they acquit in 
rape cases. Notably, the results were specifically presented as a challenge to previous 
research attributing the juries’ failure to convict in rape cases to juror bias against female 
complainants.10 Yet, this average figure includes cases where the female complainant was 
a child, which both raises different issues and in isolation exhibits a higher conviction rate. 
In cases where the complainant was a female aged over sixteen, the conviction rate was 
actually 47%. 11  Thus, the finding that juries acquit more often than convict is re-
established and notably, amongst the study’s six designated sub-categories of 
complainants, cases where the complainant was a female aged over sixteen had the lowest 
conviction rate.12 
 
A further qualification of ostensibly high conviction rates may be attributable to the 
prosecution sieving out cases in which juror attitudes would make a reasonable prospect of 
                                                          
5 COPFS, Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006) at para 2.13. It was found that 26% of 
adult rape cases prosecuted during the period analysed resulted in a conviction for rape, however this includes the 7% 
of cases prosecuted where the accused pled guilty to the charge of rape, giving the 19% figure. 
6 23% other non-conviction; 9% conviction for an alternate charge; 7% pled guilty to charge of rape - COPFS (n 5) at 
para 2.13 
7 For data to this effect see Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings in Scottish Courts 2007-08 (2009); RCS, Rape 
Crisis Scotland welcomes plans to drop the requirement for corroboration (June 2013) < 
http://www.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/workspace/uploads/files/corroborationstatement.pdf> accessed 30 July 2013 
8 For Scotland see M Burman, L Lovett and L Kelly, ‘Different systems, similar outcomes? Tracking attrition in 
reported rape cases in eleven countries: Scotland Country Report’ (2009); see also Kelly, Lovett and Regan (n 2) 
9 Thomas (n 1) at 31 
10 Ibid at 32 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid  
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conviction unlikely.13 For example, prosecutorial perception of juror prejudice may lead to 
cases discrepant to ‘what rape looks like’ (that do not match the ‘real rape’ profile or have 
a ‘real victim’) being abandoned.14 Thus whilst jury attitudes are identified as a significant 
factor in low conviction rates, through direct acquittals, they may also influence conviction 
rates through ‘downstream’ decision-making by both police and prosecutors.15  
 
Juror attitudes can simultaneously inform defence analysis of the likely trial process and 
counsel’s advice to plead guilty, which is primarily based on counsel’s assessment of the 
likelihood of conviction, encompassing their implicit understanding of the likely reception 
of evidence at trial.16 Cross-jurisdictional research has indicated that jury acquittal rates in 
rape cases are higher, but guilty plea rates are lower for sexual assaults than other crimes.17 
This implies correlativity between these two elements in contributing to the overall low 
conviction rates for rape. 
 
This position is largely mirrored in Scotland. Recent statistics show that 8% of rape 
charges indicted resulted in a plea of guilty to rape in 2006-07, 12% in 2007-08 and 11% 
in 2008-09. 18  These figures are significantly lower than High Court averages, where 
statistics show that 59% of cases were settled by a guilty plea in 2007-2008 and 55% in 
2008-2009.19  
 
Whilst it is axiomatic that an accused must not be criticised for exercising their right to a 
trial, it is suggested in Scotland, as elsewhere, that there is a continuing reciprocity 
between high jury acquittal rates and fewer guilty pleas. The high acquittal rates across 
jurisdictions would even seem to provide a statistical incentive for those factually guilty to 
‘take their chances’ with a jury as opposed to pleading guilty,20 and in Scotland those 
indicted for rape can be as much as twice as likely be acquitted than convicted.21 
 
                                                          
13 L Kelly and VE Munro, ‘A vicious cycle? Attrition and conviction patterns in reported rape cases in England and 
Wales’ in MAH Horvath and JM Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking (2009) 281; Kelly, Lovett 
and Regan (n 2) at 67 and 80 
14 Kelly and Munro (n 13) at 292-295; Larcombe (n 2) 
15  JM Brown, C Hamilton and D O'Neill, ‘Characteristics associated with rape attrition and the role played by 
scepticism or legal rationality by investigators and prosecutors’ (2007) 13(4) Psychology, Crime & Law 355; D 
Lievore, Prosecutorial decisions in adult sexual assault cases (2005) 
16 K Mack and SR Anleu, ‘Resolution without Trial, Evidence Law and the Construction of the Sexual Assault Victim’ 
in M Childs and L Ellison (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Evidence (2000) 127 at 136-138 
17 Ibid at 132; Temkin J and Krahé B, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (2008) at 21 
18 An additional 3% in 2006-07 and 2007/8 and 1% in 2008/09 pled guilty to an alternative sexual offence, see COPFS 
(n 4) 
19 COPFS, Case Processing Last 5 Years, <http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/About/corporate-info/Caseproclast5> 
accessed 30 December 2012 
20 For Australia see Larcombe (n 2) at 32; for England see Temkin and Krahé (n 17) at 21 
21 Statistically speaking it was twice as likely in both the COPFS sample year and also in 2006-2007 
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2.1(b) Legal Understanding and Attention to the Law 
 
In rape trials in Scotland, at the close of evidence, the judge charges the jury, instructing 
the jury upon the law and explaining the relevancy of the evidence to the legal ingredients 
of the charge against the accused.22 Within this context, a key concern is juror competency, 
in particular the extent to which the jury may fail to understand, or be attentive to, the 
relevant sexual offences law. 
 
The extent to which jurors encounter great difficulty in understanding and applying 
judicial instructions is the recurrent exposé of jury research literature.23 Recent research in 
England conducted with real jurors documented low levels of individual juror 
comprehension of judicial directions, with 31% of jurors fully understanding the legal 
instructions in the terms used by the judge. 24  An extrapolation of this finding to the 
Scottish context suggests that, on average, no more than five of the fifteen jurors are likely 
to fully understand judicial directions. Although the study showed measures, such as, 
written instructions can increase individual comprehension by approximately 17%,25 even 
adopting this strategy in Scotland could still mean only an average of seven of fifteen 
jurors in Scotland might fully comprehend the law.  
 
The above study did not extend to an examination of the effect of deliberative process 
upon juror comprehension of judicial direction and legal questions. However, other 
research demonstrates this is of limited effectiveness in improving comprehension, 
indicating that not only individual jurors but juries as a whole, have difficulty in 
understanding the content of judicial instruction.26  
 
Misunderstanding of the law is problematic as it encourages jurors to revert to their 
existing views and knowledge of the law, which is likely to be incorrect.27 Furthermore, 
research indicates that jurors arrive at trial with set mental representations or ‘prototypes’ 
of the offence in question, which can often contain legally inaccurate information.28 Yet 
                                                          
22 For specimen directions see Judicial Studies Committee for Scotland, Jury Manual: some notes for the guidance of 
the judiciary (rev edn 2013) at ch. 48 and 60H 
23 See P Darbyshire, A Maughan and A Stewart, ‘What can the English legal system learn from jury research published 
up to 2001?’ (2002) 
24 Thomas (n 1) at 36 
25 Ibid at 39 
26 VG Rose and JR Ogloff, ‘Evaluating the comprehensibility of jury instructions: A method and an example’ (2001) 
25(4) Law and Human Behavior 409; VG Rose and JR Ogloff, ‘The Comprehension of Judicial Instructions’ in N 
Brewer and K Williams (eds), Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective (2005) 407 
27 Darbyshire, Maughan and Stewart (n 23) at 127 
28 VL Smith, ‘Prototypes in the courtroom: Lay representations of legal concepts’ (1991) 61(6) Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 857 
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mock jurors are more likely to convict a defendant the closer the case is to the prototype of 
the offence, and reliance on prototypes can be resistant to change even with judicial 
instruction.29  
 
Jurors’ use of this ‘representativeness’ bias, coupled with the prevalence of rape myths, 
can mean that evidence is not scrutinised properly in a rape trial. 30  The ‘real rape’ 
stereotype is regarded as the prototypical representation of the offence of rape that jurors 
are likely to hold.31 The significance of the real rape myth as operating determinatively in 
verdicts is discussed fully below, however research conducted with mock jurors shows that 
some jurors vote for acquittal partly because of ‘discrepancies between the trial depiction 
of events and their own (erroneous) understanding of what rape is.’32 
 
The general findings above raise concerns about how the SO(S)A 2009 may be understood 
and applied by jurors. These concerns are borne out by mock juror research under 
counterpart legislation in England, and a perception amongst barristers that although, for 
example, a new statutory definition of consent may help promote consistency in judicial 
direction, this does not necessarily translate into consistency in jury decision-making.33  
 
In addition to the high extent of misunderstanding of the law which has been found 
amongst mock jurors operating under the relevant sexual offences legislation, there is also 
considerable concern about the extent to which mock juries generally fail to ‘engage in a 
systematic or sustained way with the legal tests’ and devote little time to discussing such 
tests. 34 One study showed that as many as 77% of mock juries did not engage in an 
extended discussion of the judge’s summing up on the law.35  
 
In a context where the Scottish, like the English, legislation is intended to provide a more 
rigorous structure for jury deliberation and to limit specifically the potential impact of 
negative social attitudes amongst jurors, it is seriously alarming that approximately 15% of 
mock juries have been found to reach a verdict in a rape trial without ‘any discursive 
                                                          
29 Ibid 
30 J Finn, E Mcdonald and Y Tinsley, ‘Identifying and Qualifying the Decision-Maker: the Case for Specialisation’ in E 
McDonald and Y Tinsley (eds), From "Real Rape" to Real Justice : Prosecuting Rape in New Zealand (2011) 221 at 
232 
31 Temkin and Krahé (n 17) at 70 
32 L Ellison and VE Munro, ‘Getting to (not) guilty: examining jurors' deliberative processes in, and beyond, the context 
of a mock rape trial’ (2010) 30(1) LS 74 at 96 
33 A Carline and C Gunby, ‘“How an Ordinary Jury Makes Sense of it is a Mystery”: Barristers’ Perspectives on Rape, 
Consent and the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ (2011) 32(3) Liverpool LR 237 at 241 
34 Ellison and Munro (n 32) at 94 
35 Ibid 
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reference to, or examination of, the law to be applied’.36 Against this decision-making 
context, it is suggested that there is already cause for scepticism over juror interaction with 
the SO(S)A 2009 in practice. 
 
2.1(c) The Complainer ‘on trial’ 
 
A significant part of the decision-making context in rape trials is the focus upon the 
complainer. Rape trials frequently lack extrinsic evidence. Simultaneously, the facts that 
the accused cannot be compelled to give evidence, and the complainer is likely to be 
questioned in far more detail than the accused, has always undercut any notion that a rape 
trial consists of ‘his word against hers’.37 
 
Consequently, complainer credibility is a key influence upon jurors’ decisions as to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused. Research confirms that higher perceptions of 
complainant credibility are positively associated with stronger mock juror beliefs in 
perpetrator guilt.38 However, it also confirms that the judgment of the credibility of the 
complainant is more likely to be based on mock jurors’ pre-existing personal prejudices 
and attitudes about how a ‘real’ victim of rape would behave, than the content of the 
testimony.39 A belief in guilt in a specific case is positively correlated with more positive 
and less stereotypical attitudes towards rape victims in general, whilst more positive 
attitudes towards the specific accused are associated with less favourable attitudes towards 
rape victims in general.40 
 
At trial, the exploitation of negative or misinformed social attitudes to undermine 
complainer credibility can be a key element in defence strategies.41 Internationally, and in 
Scotland, defence strategy includes, for example, the derogation of the complainer’s 
character and behaviour, 42  the exploitation of stereotypes, 43  including portraying the 
normal behaviour of women as ‘unusual’ or inconsistent with a ‘genuine’ complaint of 
                                                          
36 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
37 B Brown, M Burman and L Jamieson, Sex Crimes on Trial: The Use of Sexual Evidence in Scottish Courts (1993) at 
70 
38 N Taylor and J Joudo, The impact of pre-recorded video and closed circuit television testimony by adult sexual 
assault complainants on jury decision-making: an experimental study (2005) 
39 Ibid at 59-60 
40 Ibid at 34 
41 SLC, Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences (Scot Law Com No 209, 2007) at para 2.11; J Temkin ‘"And 
Always Keep A-Hold of Nurse, For Fear of Finding Something Worse": Challenging Rape Myths in the Courtroom’ 
(2010) 13(4) New Crim L Rev 710 at 719 
42 B Brown, M Burman and L Jamieson, Sexual History and Sexual Character Evidence in Scottish Sexual Offence 
Trials (1992) at 73 
43 J Temkin, ‘Prosecuting and defending rape: Perspectives from the bar’ (2000) 27(2) J Law & Soc 219; Temkin and 
Krahé (n 17) at 129.  See also New South Wales Department for Women, Heroines of Fortitude: The Experiences of 
Women in Court as Victims of Sexual Assault (1996) 
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rape44 and suggestions of a complainer’s ‘blameworthiness’.45 Cross-examination of this 
sort will act as a psychological ‘prime’ to individual jurors who hold prejudicial attitudes, 
increasing the likelihood that these attitudes influence their decision-making rather than an 
objective assessment of the evidence.46 
 
The potential scope for prejudicial attitudes to impact upon jury decision-making in 
Scotland, as elsewhere, is compounded by a number of intertwined factors. This includes 
the failure of the ‘rape shield’ measures intended to preclude this risk to meet legislative 
intent, 47  the ‘bad behaviour’ of defence counsel 48  and the increasing scrutiny and 
exploitation of a complainer’s private, medical and personal records.49 
 
In Scotland, seven out of ten rape complainers are questioned on sexual history and 
character. 50  The proportion of trials with s.275 applications to introduce evidence 
otherwise prohibited has increased by almost three and half times under the SO(PE)(S)A 
2002, and almost all applications to admit evidence are successful.51  
 
Although the increase in s.275 applications is partly attributable to the widened definition 
of character, this definition, of itself, ‘plays into the potential archival value of psychiatric, 
psychological and social work records for attacks on the complainer’s character’. 52 
Simultaneously, an increase in defence exploitation of complainers personal and medical 
records is predicted to result from the recent extension to the prosecutors’ duty of 
disclosure in Scotland. 53   Concern has been raised that information acquired from 
historical psychiatric or psychological records can be disproportionately prejudicial to 
                                                          
44 L Ellison, ’Closing the credibility gap: The prosecutorial use of expert witness testimony in sexual assault cases’ 
(2005) 9(4) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 239 at 248-250; Temkin (n 43); Z Adler, Rape on Trial 
(1987) at 19 
45 G Chambers and A Millar, ‘Proving Sexual Assault: Prosecuting the Offender or Persecuting the Victim?’ in A 
Worral and P Carlen (eds) Gender, Crime and Justice (1987) 58; Temkin and Krahé (n 17) at 134; see also Kelly and 
Munro (n 13) 
46 Temkin and Krahé (n 17) at 178; see also SLC (n 41) at para 2.11, who note that even if the defence does not appeal 
to negative social attitudes at trial, the jury may well use this sort of reasoning in deciding whether there was consent 
anyway 
47 M Burman and others, Impact of Aspects of the Law of Evidence in Sexual Offence Trials: An Evaluation Study 
(2007); in England see L Kelly, J Temkin and S Griffiths, Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual 
history evidence in rape trials (2006) 
48 Temkin (n 43): Temkin and Krahé (n 17) at 129. 
49 Larcombe (n 2) at 38; W Larcombe, ‘The ‘Ideal’ Victim v Successful Rape Complainants: Not What You Might 
Expect’ (2002) 10(2) Fem LS 131 at 136 
50 Burman and others (n 47) at 2 
51 Ibid. Although partial refusals, amendments and restrictions on questioning mean that a significant proportion of 
applications are modified by the court 
52 F Raitt, ‘Independent legal representation for complainers in sexual offence trials: research report for Rape Crisis 
Scotland’ (2010) <http://ww.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/workspace/publications/IndLegalRepReport-2010.pdf> 
accessed 29 July 2013 at para 7.27 
53 See F Raitt, ‘Disclosure of records and privacy rights in rape cases’ (2011) 15(1) Edin LR 33 
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complainers, because it allows the general public, and therefore juror, ignorance of mental 
disorders to be fused with rape myths and stereotypes.54   
 
In Scotland, restricted evidence also continues to be introduced at trial without prior 
application.55 In cases where inadmissible information is adduced at trial, the judge is 
unlikely to be able to correct this once the evidence is in front of the jury. There is strong 
evidence that this would not preclude any deleterious impact with a recent meta-analysis 
incorporating forty-eight studies, revealing that jurors are affected by the contents of 
inadmissible evidence even when expressly instructed by the judge to ignore it. 56 
Additionally, any contested evidence eventually ruled admissible accentuates that 
information and has an even stronger effect on juror verdicts. 57 
 
Furthermore, research also reveals that there is an earnest insistence amongst mock jurors 
about their need for information about, for example, a complainants’s sexual past.58 Where 
jurors believe that the complainant’s sexual history will assist them in determining whether 
she has been raped but such evidence is excluded as inadmissible, jurors will look for 
subtle cues, from her behaviour at the time of the incident to her behaviour in court.59 
Research consistently demonstrates that jurors are inclined to ‘fill in’ evidential gaps with 
speculation as to the complainant’s overall character and credibility.60 
 
Against this decision-making context, the new model of consent in Scotland is intended to 
help divert the jury’s attention away from the complainer and redirect it to the accused 
through the reasonable steps requirement.61 Yet this provision exists within an isolated 
doctrinal vacuum, and even then the obvious weakness is that the accused is not required 
to produce evidence of steps taken to ascertain consent. 62 Where an accused exercises his 
right not to give testimony, it will be difficult to conduct the reasonable steps assessment.63 
Although some negative inference might be commented upon by the prosecution, or even 
the judge, this would require to be most delicately crafted so that it does not contradict the 
                                                          
54 Ibid at 48-49 
55 Burman and others (n 47) at 5 
56 N Steblay and others, ‘The impact on juror verdicts of judicial instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence: A 
meta-analysis.’ (2006) 30(4) Law and Human Behavior 469 
57 Ibid 
58 E Finch and VE Munro, ‘Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases Involving Intoxicants’ (2005) 45 BJ 
Crim 25 at 36 
59 Ibid; DD Koski, ‘Jury Decisionmaking in Rape Trials: A Review and Empirical Assessment’ (2002) 38(1) Criminal 
Law Bulletin-Boston 21 
60 L Ellison and VE Munro, ‘A Stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room? Critical Reflections Upon 
Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study’ (2010) 13(4) New Crim L Rev 781 
61 SLC (n 41) at para 3.77 
62 S Cowan, 'All Change or Business as Usual? Reforming the Law of Rape in Scotland' in McGlynn C and Munro VE 
(eds), Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (2011) 154 at 165 
63 Ibid  
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accused’s presumption of innocence; 64 an issue upon which the SO(S)A 2009 is silent.65 
Thus it would appear within the real courtroom context, the jury will continue to scrutinise 
the complainer and she may firmly remain the one ‘on trial’. 
 
2.2 Juror Attitudes 
 
The following sections examine the ways in which the four categories of rape myths 
identified in chapter 1 impact upon juror decision-making. This analysis highlights the 
extent to which jurors’ rely on these myths as part of the process of weighing up the 
evidence, thus tainting the partiality of decision-making. 
 
These findings assume increasing significance in light of the recent reform of the 
substantive law in Scotland. The expanded definition of rape, which reflects ‘what should 
ordinarily be considered to be the offence of rape’,66 is designed to give legal effect to the 
underlying moral principle of the protection of sexual autonomy..67 As will be examined 
below, a particular concern is the extent to which juror attitudes may undermine the 
normative force behind the SO(S)A 2009, which seeks to prevent the disqualification of all 
experiences of non-consensual sexual intercourse from legal classification as rape.  
 
2.2(a) ‘Women Cry Rape’ Myths 
 
Concern has been raised that the proportion of jurors likely to believe ‘women cry rape’ 
myths, means in the first instance that ‘a large minority of potential jury members are pre-
disposed to a not-guilty verdict in the case of rape’.68  A tentative extrapolation of the 
wider population surveys discussed in chapter 2 to a Scottish jury, acknowledging the 
variation in findings, could therefore indicate that possibly at least two, and as many as six, 
jurors may be predisposed to believing the complaint may be false without even hearing a 
case. 
 
There are, of course, limits to this sort of uncritical extrapolation. However, beliefs in the 
high frequency of false rape have been found to be more prevalent in the course of mock 
                                                          
64 Ibid  
65 Ibid  
66 Scottish Government, Sexual Offences (Scotland) Bill:  Policy Memorandum (2008) at para 38. Emphasis added. 
67 SLC (n 41) at para 1.23 
68 C Cunliffe and others, ‘Do rape myths affect juror decision making? A systematic review of the literature.’ (A BPP 
University College School of Health/Professional Development Working Paper, November 2012) < 
http://www.bpp.com/carbon-content-1.0-
SNAPSHOT/resources/ECMDocument?contentName=Rape_myths_Dec_2012>Accessed 30 July 2013 at 2 
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jury deliberations than attitudinal surveys previously completed by mock jurors would 
indicate.69  Indeed, evidence suggests a ‘strong preoccupation within the (mock) jury room 
on the risk of a fabricated claim’.70 Further, within the structural requirements of verdict 
deliberations, including a standard of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, mock jurors’ 
wider beliefs have been found to intensify as an obstacle to conviction in the specific case. 
Mock jurors have been found to justify ‘their preferences for acquittal by insisting that, 
since false allegations are routinely made, the possibility of fabrication in the present case 
could not be ruled out’.71  
 
The reasons advanced by mock jurors as to what might conceivably prompt women to 
make a false accusation, indicate that the highly gendered ‘Victorian conception of women 
as “mad, bad, or sad" retains popular currency’.72 Mock jurors routinely speculate as to 
whether the complainant is the ‘sort of woman’ either sufficiently revengeful to fabricate a 
rape allegation in response to unreciprocated affections, or, given the persistent belief 
amongst mock jurors that women as more likely to consent to sexual intercourse when 
intoxicated, likely to retract that consent retrospectively when sober and falsely accuse out 
of regret.73 Additionally, the suggestion that the complainant might have falsely accused 
the defendant because she was mentally or emotionally unstable, has been found to have 
been given ‘serious and sustained’ consideration by jurors in 33% of mock juries.74 
 
This evidence indicates that juror decisions in Scotland are likely to be negatively 
influenced by beliefs in ‘women cry rape’ myths. 
 
2.2(b) ‘Real Rape’ Myths 
 
Where the circumstances of a rape case fail to replicate the ‘real rape’ stereotype jurors 
may be less disposed to find the complainer credible, may be more likely to construct a 
‘story’ in line with an accused’s version of events and be disinclined to convict.75 In the 
following sub-sections, the ‘real rape’ myth is broken down into constitutive variables in 
demonstrating the extent to which ‘real rape’ continues to substantially influence juror 
decision-making.  
                                                          
69 Ellison and Munro (n 60) at 795 
70 Ibid at 785 
71 Ibid at 798 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid at 795-798; Kelly and Munro (n 13) at 291-293 
74 Ellison and Munro (n 60) at 797 
75 Temkin and Krahé (n 17) at 69; MR Burt and RS Albin, ‘Rape myths, rape definitions, and probability of conviction’ 
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2.2(b)(i) Perpetrator 
 
It has been found that many mock jurors are nowadays  ‘willing to accept that many 
(indeed most) rapes do not involve a ‘‘stranger in the bushes’’’, 76  and appear ‘to be 
receptive to the idea that a woman could be raped by a man that she knew and, moreover, 
trusted’.77 This potential diminution in a descriptive belief in real rape may be mirrored in 
Scottish society, where research shows that 13% of the public believe rape by a stranger is 
the norm.78 
 
However, in specific cases of acquaintance rape, mock jury research indicates that ‘this 
recognition has done little to ameliorate reluctance to convict perpetrators, particularly in 
the absence of signs of physical resistance and/or injury on the part of the complainant’.79 
 
Belief in ‘real rape’ as a gradation in rape is emphasised by the fact that where the 
perpetrator was an acquaintance, although never having been in a sexual relationship with 
the complainer, some mock jurors imply that stranger rape is more serious and/or 
traumatic.80 This gradation can consequently impact upon the prescriptive demands of real 
rape amongst mock jurors.  
 
Evidence shows that the claim that a woman might be unable to offer ongoing resistance 
during an assault due to fear induced paralysis, is typically only accepted by mock jurors 
where the perpetrator is a stranger.81 Mock jurors appear to differentiate between stranger 
and acquaintance rape through estimating a hierarchy of fear, judging that victims of an 
acquaintance rape would be less fearful.82 As a consequence of this gradation, jurors have 
been found to place more onerous expectations of resistance upon complainants of 
acquaintance rape.83 Indeed, the research illustrates there is a typical expectation amongst 
mock jurors that ‘a genuine victim of acquaintance rape would have sustained (or inflicted) 
                                                          
76 Ellison and Munro (n 60) at 784 
77 Ibid at 789 
78 B Cameron and L Murphy, Campaign Evaluation Report Rape Crisis Scotland “This is not an invitation to Rape 
Me”: Research Report (2008) at 13 
79 Ellison and Munro (n 60) at 800 
80 For discussion see Kelly and Munro (n 13) at 292  
81 L Ellison and VE Munro, ‘Reacting to Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant Credibility’ 
(2009) 49(2) BJ Crim 202 at 207; Ellison and Munro (n 60) at 790 
82 Ellison and Munro (n 60) at 790; Ellison and Munro (n 81) at 207 
83 Ellison and Munro (n 60) at 790; Ellison and Munro (n 81) at 207 
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bodily injuries consistent with the application of substantial force and strenuous physical 
resistance’.84 
 
The evidence suggesting the widespread awareness of the reality of acquaintance rape in 
Scotland, may be contrasted with the studies indicating the scepticism with which 
acquaintance rapes are likely to appraised amongst jurors. To any extent that the ‘stranger’ 
element, as an isolated variable in the ‘real rape’ myth, has weakened, it merely 
accentuates the strength of perceptions of gradation in the seriousness of rape and the force 
ingredient as discussed more fully below. 
 
2.2(b)(ii) Force and Resistance 
 
Across mock deliberations, juror comments ‘testify to the tenacity of the force requirement 
in the popular understanding of rape’. 85 It has been found that mock jurors frequently 
display an ‘unshakeable’ commitment to the belief that a ‘normal’ response to sexual 
attack would be to struggle physically, and routinely advance the complainants lack of 
bruising as a rationale for acquittal.86 One study documented that the complainant’s failure 
to exhibit signs of physical injury negatively influenced the decisions of an overwhelming 
88% of mock jurors.87 
 
One study found that only a minority of mock jurors accepted that a woman might not 
resist an assault as a result of fear induced paralysis, however, frequently in these 
circumstances expectations of physical injury simply transferred to expectations of internal 
or genital injury.88 This further expectation of detectable genital trauma is even more at 
odds with empirical reality, given only approximately 1% of rape victims have moderate to 
severe genital injuries .89  
 
Furthermore, the research suggests that mock jurors hold ‘unrealistic expectations 
regarding a woman’s capacity to struggle or to inflict defensive injury upon her 
assailant’. 90   In a mock trial where the complainant exhibited some bruising and 
                                                          
84 Ellison and Munro (n 60) at 790 
85 Finch and Munro (n 1) at 319; see also Ellison and Munro (n 81) 206-208 and L Ellison and VE Munro, ‘Turning 
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scratching, and this was testified by a medical expert to be consistent with the application 
of considerable physical force, a substantial proportion of the mock jurors expected higher 
levels of injury to be convinced.91 Additionally, evidence suggests a strong preoccupation 
amongst mock jurors with advancing alternate explanations for injuries. In a particular 
study, a contingent of jurors argued that ‘the possibility could, and should, not be ruled out 
that the complainant’s bruises were deliberately self-inflicted in order to support her 
fabricated allegation of rape’ .92 Although it is difficult to criticise jurors for considering 
alternative explanations, the inference is that, some mock jurors, to be convinced of the 
complainants non-consent, may require the complainant ‘(rather unrealistically)… to 
exhibit injuries that were not only severe, but unambiguously attributable to the deliberate 
infliction of unwanted violence’.93  
 
Modern studies examining real conviction patterns in England indicate that claims of non-
consensual intercourse which are not accompanied by evidence of physical force and 
attendant resistance are significantly less likely to culminate in a rape conviction. 94 
Similarly in Scotland, convictions are also more likely where the case involves 
documented injuries.95 Given that it would surely be surprising if the presence of such 
injuries made a conviction less likely in a rape trial, it has been argued that there is danger 
to conflating high conviction rates with juror belief in the real rape myth, thus confusing 
the ability of ‘real rape’ to modify the credibility conflict.96 
 
However, the evidence amassed strongly supports that the ‘real rape’ myth does negatively 
and inappropriately govern the credibility conflict. It would appear that jurors continue to 
regard physical injuries, or at least vaginal injuries, as the sine qua non of non-consensual 
intercourse. This raises concern in Scotland about the extent to which jurors are likely to 
continue to subscribe to narrow force based subjective definition of rape.  
 
These findings are of particular relevance in light of the anticipated removal of the unique 
requirement for corroborative evidence as a pre-requisite for prosecution in Scotland. 
Corroboration has been viewed as a significant impediment to the successful prosecution 
                                                          
91 Ibid at 208 
92 Ibid 
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and Regan (n 2); Brown, Hamilton and O’Neill (n 15) 
95 Burman, Lovett and Kelly (n 8) at 9; COPFS (n 5) at para 2.26 
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of rape partly because physical injuries are uncommon.97 Whilst the removal may allow 
certain complaints where there are no corroborative external injuries documented to 
proceed to trial, it seems unlikely that this will achieve any material difference in practice, 
given the extent to which mock juror deliberations affirm the persistency of the force 
requirement ‘if not to constitute the offence of rape then certainly to act as a necessary 
corroboration of the complainant’s account.’98 
 
2.2(b)(iii) Delayed Reporting 
 
Across various studies expectations regarding the immediate reporting of an incidence of 
rape continue to form an integral dimension of mock jurors strong conceptions about how 
a ‘real’ victim of rape would behave post-assault.99 Mock jurors often fail to appreciate the 
complex internal and external factors that may discourage the immediate reporting of a 
rape,100 and construe delays in the reporting of a rape to the police as severely weakening 
the prosecution case and as a rationale for a not guilty verdict .101 One study illustrative of 
this found that the pure circumstance of a three-day delay in reporting an alleged assault to 
the police, negatively impacted upon the decisions of 58% of mock jurors.102  
 
Expectations of an immediate report can be motivated by juror beliefs in the prevalence of 
false allegations. For example, an immediate report increases the likelihood that some 
mock jurors will perceive the complaint as veracious, given a perception that it would take 
time to fabricate an allegation.103  
 
Recent studies confirm that a conviction may be less likely through the pure fact that the 
complainer has delayed reporting to the police.104  This raises concern that, despite the fact 
that immediate reporting within twenty-four hours has not been a pre-requisite for legal 
redress in Scotland since 1697,105 it may remain a de facto requirement amongst some 
jurors in Scotland.  
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2.2(d)(iv) Emotional Demeanour  
 
In reality, rape victims experience disparate emotional effects which can endure until, and 
beyond, their appearance in court.106 However, mock jurors typically exhibit a lack of 
awareness of the psychological responses to being raped. 107  The expectation that a 
complainant will be visibly upset during her testimony continues to dominate mock jurors’ 
estimations of how a ‘real’ victim of rape would present. An extensive body of research 
consistently demonstrates that as a result of these expectations regarding appropriate 
emotional expression, mock jurors routinely draw negative inferences as to credibility 
from the complainant’s apparent failure to present as more visibly distressed. 108  In 
particular, a complainant’s failure to appear more emotionally upset during her testimony 
can negatively influence the decisions of approximately 60% of mock jurors; 109  and 
diminish the likelihood of the return of a guilty verdict.110 
 
Of further significance is the finding that, whilst the absence of complainant distress is 
destructive to mock juror’s perceptions of complainant credibility, rather paradoxically, 
visible distress is not regarded as corroborative.111 The significance of the complainant 
exhibiting a visibly upset demeanour is bifurcated. Mock jurors either view this as 
symptomatic of the fact that the complainant is communicating the details of a traumatic 
event; or more sceptically regard the complainant as managing ‘both their emotions and 
their overall appearance as a means of eliciting sympathy and/or shoring up their 
credibility’.112  
 
Neither increased nor decreased emotionality is an indicator of veracity, or the lack of it. 
Yet, whilst some mock jurors seem all too willing to recognise this as a means to disparage 
the emotional complainer, they perversely fail to extend this recognition to the 
unemotional complainer. These findings are highly significant in the Scottish context 
where it has been found that approximately three-fifths of rape complainers are crying or 
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sobbing when giving their oral testimony,113 indicating that a substantial proportion of 
complainers are not. 
 
The evidence would suggest that the apparent failure of complainers in Scotland to present 
as more visibly upset may be exerting a deleterious affect on juror assessments of 
credibility, and verdicts subsequently delivered, in two fifths of cases.   
 
2.2(c) Consent Myths 
 
Scotland, like England, has witnessed the recasting of consent provisions into a more 
structured model grounded in agreement about sexual intercourse between parties, and the 
absence of reasonable belief consent is now an essential component of the substantive 
definition of rape in both jurisdictions.  Both the SO(S)A 2009 and the SOA 2003 envisage 
an active, rather than passive, model of consent and a co-operative and interactive 
understanding of sexuality.  
 
In both jurisdictions the self-designated legislative ambition has been to diminish the 
extent to which the jury might appeal to inappropriate socio-sexual conventions in 
determining consent, and to minimise reliance on stereotypes of female sexuality. 114 
 
2.2(c)(i) Consent and Reasonable Belief 
  
When assessing complainant consent and an accused’s reasonable belief in consent, mock 
jurors rely substantially on their own subjective perceptions of a complainant’s earlier 
positive signals as implying antecedent consent to sexual intercourse. 115  Certainly, 
evidence shows jurors continue to assume consent in the absence of express dissent, and 
complainants are expected to actively and assertively demonstrate a lack of consent, 
despite the fact that this is not strictly required under the SOA 2003 or the SO(S)A 
2009.116  Even more disconcertingly it has been found that a lack of positive indication of 
consent, even where accompanied by verbal resistance, is rarely sufficient for mock jurors 
to hold a defendant guilty of rape.117 Frequently only the presence of force and attendant 
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resistance is sufficient to revoke the determinacy of earlier signals in mock jurors’ 
minds.118 
 
Despite legislative intent, what jurors consider as ‘earlier signals’ often reflect 
inappropriate socio-sexual conventions and stereotypes of female sexuality.119 Research 
shows that mock jurors rely upon ‘social conventions which indicate that women who 
drink or flirt with men, or who take steps to initiate some intimacy, cannot complain when 
men take this behaviour to imply a willingness to engage in intercourse thereafter.’120 Prior 
behaviours routinely regarded by mock jurors as indirectly implying willingness to engage 
in sexual intercourse, include inviting a person into one's home, remaining in one another's 
company for a prolonged period, receiving compliments, sharing a goodnight kiss, and 
embarking upon tentative body contact such as brushing against one another. 121  In 
particular, mock jurors frequently emphasise the social significance of shared alcohol 
consumption as an indicator of consent.122 For example, offering a male companion wine, 
as opposed to a non-alcoholic drink, ‘sort of says something’.123 Research with barristers 
in England also highlights that jurors can consider a very general invitation, for example a 
complainant’s inviting a defendant ‘back to the bedroom’, ‘with other people, sitting on the 
bed, listening to music’, as supporting a reasonable belief in consent.124  
 
The generalities of these earlier ‘invitations’ means that amongst mock jurors, ‘while the 
fact of a previous acquaintanceship per se may not be problematic, much of its irrelevance 
will hang on it being an exclusively distant and platonic one’. 125  Perhaps of greatest 
concern is research which found that whilst potential jurors ostensibly accepted that beliefs 
about consent should be ‘reasonable’, when given rape scenarios to discuss, the study 
subjects were inclined to excuse ‘honest’ mistakes. 126  In England, barristers view the 
impact of the reformulated mens rea under the SOA 2003 as minimal; and the perception is 
that it is relatively easy for the defence to establish a reasonable belief .127 
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These findings raise concern in Scotland that the jury may be reluctant to give primacy to 
sexual self-determination, when determining the complainer’s consent and accused’s 
reasonable belief in consent. Based on the evidence, it would appear that the jury are likely 
to undermine consent as an ‘active’ model, with the virtually exclusive focus of attention 
being given to the complainer’s behaviour prior to the incident.  The likely determinacy of 
these earlier signals is problematic in assessing whether a rape has occurred, as it is 
consent at the time of intercourse that is the issue. These findings further highlight the 
extent to which juror attitudes are likely to frustrate the legislative provision explicitly 
intended to negate implied escalation of consent. 128  Furthermore, the evidence raises 
significant questions over the extent to which the jury will follow the law in abandoning 
the ‘honest belief’ defence, which has been characterised as a ‘rapist’s charter’.129  
 
2.2(c)(ii) Intoxication and Capacity to Consent 
 
The SO(S)A 2009 dictates that an individual is incapable of consenting to any conduct 
whilst asleep or unconscious.130 Furthermore, where the complainer is located somewhere 
upon the continuum from sober to unconscious through alcohol consumption, free 
agreement will automatically be absent where the individual is incapable of consenting to 
conduct.131 
 
The matter of when a complainer lacks capacity to consent as a consequence of alcohol 
consumption is determined by the jury in Scotland.132 Similarly in England, the issue of 
‘capacity’ is left to the jury. Yet what emerges from research is that some mock jurors 
adopt such a minimalist interpretation of ‘capacity’ to consent as to equate it with mere 
consciousness. 133  This interpretation stands in stark contradiction to the legal position 
whereby capacity to consent to sexual intercourse may be lost before consciousness. It has 
been suggested that intoxicated consent is particularly problematic, due to a societal 
presumption that women are always capable of saying no, irrespective of their degree of 
intoxication.134 Research confirms the common belief amongst mock jurors that as long as 
a woman is conscious, then their level of intoxication will never be such as to render them 
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incapable of expressing dissent to intercourse. 135 This expectation appears very deeply 
embedded, with some mock jurors insisting that even where the complainant was heavily 
intoxicated, they would expect to find evidence of physical struggle to establish non-
consent.136 
 
The difficulty is that, ‘where the question is one of establishing the degree of 
intoxication… the credibility of the witness is paramount’,137 yet there is an important 
distinction to be drawn between any potential impact which intoxication has on the 
complainer’s evidence and the pure fact of the complainer’s intoxication. 138 The pure 
circumstance of victim intoxication negatively affects perceptions of victim character and 
morality139 and reduces perceptions of credibility amongst jurors;140 as well as increasing 
attributions of victim blame as discussed laterally. Indeed, as Cowan argues ‘leaving the 
issue of capacity to the jury then, is not necessarily the answer to the problem of 
intoxicated consent’.141 
 
There are significant concerns over the vagaries of intoxicated consent in Scotland as 
elsewhere, and it has been found that convictions are less likely in Scotland where the 
complainer is intoxicated.142 Juror attitudes are particularly significant in this context given 
incident profiling in Scotland has revealed that 44% of rape complainers have consumed 
alcohol at the time of the assault and around 6% have consumed drugs, with 45% of those 
consuming either substance reported to be severely affected at the time.143 
 
2.2(d) Victim Precipitation Myths 
 
Juries have been found less likely to convict a defendant of rape if the complainant 
engaged in non-gender-conforming behaviour, either in terms of their general ‘lifestyle’ 
and/or their behaviour preceding the offence.144 Female victims who violate traditional 
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gender roles are generally attributed more blame than those who do not,145 and in a rape 
trial, attributions of blame will often be a reliable indicator of the final verdict. 146 In 
England, qualitative interviews with judges and barristers reveal a perception that juries are 
‘desperately moralistic’ singularly in sexual assault trials.147 Similarly, barristers are able 
to identify whole categories of ‘sure fire losers’ cases, for example, where the complainant 
was intoxicated or where some level of consensual intimacy preceded the rape.148 
 
As discussed earlier, jurors’ perceptions and expectations of stranger rape and 
acquaintance rape differ considerably, and greater blame is generally attributed to a 
complainant by mock jurors when she knows her assailant and estimations of her 
credibility are reduced.149 This effect is even more pronounced amongst mock jurors where 
the relationship has entailed past sexual intercourse. 150  This differentiation may not 
transfer to other crimes, with one study illustrating that knowledge about a prior 
relationship between victim and perpetrator increases perceptions of victim blame for rape, 
but not for robbery.151   
 
It has long been shown that knowledge that a complainer has an active sexual history has a 
marked negative effect on guilt judgments, substantially reducing the number of 
participants who would find the defendant guilty. 152 A recent study confirms ongoing 
reliance on this extra-legal consideration in mock juror decision-making, with jurors 
speculating as to whether the complainant was the ‘sort of woman’ prone to sexual 
promiscuity .153 
 
2.2(d)(i) Intoxication and Blame 
 
The SO(S)A 2009 is concerned with the complainer’s capacity at the time of the 
intercourse, to which the cause of the complainer’s intoxication is firmly relegated as 
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irrelevant.154 This is salient given that, as noted, in Scotland complainer intoxication is 
negatively correlated with conviction and a significant proportion of complainers have 
consumed alcohol. 
 
The new definition was specifically intended to diminish the legal impact of beliefs that 
intoxicated victims are ‘asking for it’,155 yet in practice, this may be rather meaningless 
when it comes to attributions of responsibility and blame. It has been shown that, not only 
do mock jurors attribute responsibility for sexual intercourse to the complainant when she 
has consumed alcohol, but strikingly her responsibility remains paramount even in 
scenarios where the defendant has deliberately taken advantage of her intoxication or 
deliberately targeted her through spiking her drink with alcohol.156 
 
There exists a double standard in juror attitudes towards intoxication in rape cases; an 
asymmetry whereby intoxication tends to increase the female’s perceived responsibility yet 
lower the male perpetrators perceived responsibility.157 Similarly, a victim’s intoxication 
precipitates a derogatory effect upon perceptions of her character,158 whilst a defendant’s 
intoxication does not.159  
 
Alcohol consumption by a woman can be sufficient to absolve the defendant of all 
responsibility, and legal liability to the complainant.160 The possible function of alcohol in 
reducing or absolving defendant perceived responsibility is deeply problematic, and a 
salient concern given profiling in Scotland shows approximately 35% of suspects have 
consumed alcohol at the time of the offence. 161  This proclivity amongst mock jurors 
conflicts with the requirement to ignore a defendant’s voluntary intoxication in both 
England and Scotland.162 Such non-observance of this fundamental tenet of criminal law is 
exemplified in one mock juror’s assertion that, ‘he [the defendant] was in a fairly sober 
state of mind, so you know, he should have been able to judge: if he’d been fairly drunk as 
well, then I don’t think it would be a question of rape’.163   
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Victim intoxication can increase both perceptions of victim responsibility and blame, and 
reduces both perpetrator responsibility and blame. 164  As noted, there is correlativity 
between attributions of responsibility and blame, and the later will often be a reliable 
indicator of final verdict.165 A recent study shows that where a complainant is intoxicated, 
jurors both blame the complainant more and are less likely to convict the defendant.166 
Another study reveals that as many of 89% of the mock jurors who attribute some blame to 
an intoxicated complainant and less than complete blame to the defendant vote not 
guilty.167  
 
The problem posed by the pure fact of complainer intoxication, either in relation to consent 
or culpability, is problematic and could have a negative effect on outcomes in a high 
number of in Scotland, as well as the rest of the UK.168 
 
2.3 The Impact of Juror Attitudes on Law Reform 
 
The jury, as a measure of community input to the justice system, is a justification for the 
institution expounded all over the common law world. However, in the context of a rape 
trial the jury, as microcosm of ‘the community’, is as much a repository of community 
prejudice as conscience. In particular, the preceding sections have demonstrated that 
complainers’ experiences of rape may unjustifiably be invalidated by the justice system 
because of juror subscription to the four myths identified. In tandem, the problem with 
juror secrecy is not that it permits juries to disregard community values but rather that it 
permits juries to apply them in defiance of the law. The evidence assembled suggests that 
where attrition does occur ‘on consideration of the evidence by the jury at the conclusion 
of a trial’ in Scotland, negative social attitudes are key to explaining high acquittal rates. 
 
Propounding the ‘community input’ rationale, the New Zealand Law Commission 
(‘NZLC’) went as far as to suggest that, because there is a continuum between sexual 
offending and acceptable sexual interaction, the question of where the line is drawn means 
‘sexual offending is relevant to the community in a way that some other offences are 
not’.169 Yet, there is a deep fallaciousness to such an argument. Diverse community views 
about what is an ‘invitation’ to, or constitutes ‘acceptable’, sexual interaction are unhelpful 
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where they deviate from, or are irrelevant to, legal requirements. 170  As it has been 
conceptualised in other jurisdictions, the institution of the jury may therefore create an 
obstructive dichotomy between ‘elite’ opinions’ creation of laws that promote female 
autonomy, and ‘popular’ opinions’ control over the consent/non-consent decision at 
trial.171  
 
The law’s doctrinal conversion to liability for rape based in lack of consent has been 
identified elsewhere as an exemplar of continued ‘jury nullification’, where the jury 
continue to neutralise the legislative prohibition of all instances of non-consensual sexual 
intercourse.172 Similarly, it is submitted that the jury cannot be relied upon to objectively 
deliver the law in Scotland, which is likely to lead inadvertently to a divorce of the SO(S)A 
2009 in theory and in practice. 
 
The apparent shortcomings of jury decision-making are likely to frustrate the progressive 
intentions of the SO(S)A 2009. However, the approaches taken to legislative reform in 
both Scotland and England, particularly the reformulated statutory definitions of consent 
and mens rea requirements, have not been without criticism.173 Ultimately these concerns 
over drafting on both sides of the border can be condensed into, not ill-founded, concerns 
over juror attitudes. In particular, the drafting of both pieces of legislation has attracted 
criticism for failing to be sufficiently instructive to juries, and for deploying vague or 
undefined terms which entertain too much latitude for jurors to import their subjective 
interpretations and understandings of consent.174  
 
Yet irrespective of any shortcomings, it cannot be concluded that the problem is with the 
legislation. Negative social attitudes towards rape and rape myths cannot effectively be 
redressed by statutory revision of the substantive law or modifying rules of evidence or 
procedure .175 Seeking to further define substantive terms may be a difficult task, as mock 
jury research shows that legislative terms, even where deemed knowable, have an 
inherently disparate effect amongst mock jurors, with no assurance that all jurors 
                                                          
170 Finn, McDonald and Tinsley (n 30) at 250 
171  D Dripps, ‘Rape, Law and American society’ in C McGlynn and VE Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: 
International and Comparative Perspectives (2011) 224 at 235 
172 Ibid; see also D Dripps, ‘After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault’ 
(2008) 41 Akron L Rev 957 
173 For critical commentary of the SO(S)A 2009 see A Brown, Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 (2009) at 37-43 
174 Amongst others see Cowan (n 62) at 164-165; J Temkin and A Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003:(1) Rape, 
sexual assaults and the problems of consent’ [2004] Crim LR 328; Finch and Munro (n 1); in Scotland ACPOS 
argued that juries needed more guidance legislative terms – see Justice Committee Official Report 25 (2009) ‘Sexual 
Offences (Scotland) Bill’. Online. Available at: 
<www.scottishparliament.uk/s3/committees/justice/inquiries/SexualOffences/index.htm;> 1333-5 
175 Rumney and Fenton (n 137) at 289; see also Dripps (n 172) at 971 
 42 
understand them as the same thing within abstract or specific circumstances.176 A further 
hazard of more detailed or technically itemised legislation, is the risk that it may perversely 
only create inequitable perceptions of categories of complainers. 177 Commenting upon 
rebuttable presumptions as to lack of consent in England, it has already been noted that, 
where a presumption applies there may be a perception that the prosecution are: 
[D]ependent upon a burden being placed on the defendant in order to win, 
which potentially reinforces certain myths about ‘‘good rape victims’’ and 
‘‘real rapes’’ - ‘‘Good victims’’ do not need the law’s assistance to achieve a 
conviction; her evidence alone will suffice in convincing the jury as to the guilt 
of the accused.178  
 
Furthermore, any attempt to draft legislation impenetrable to bias would likely be rendered 
futile given the research indicating the extent to which jurors are likely to fail to interact 
with the relevant sexual offences law, and to make decisions without any reference to the 
applicable legal test.179  
 
The intrinsic difficulty is, as Cowan notes in Scotland, ‘these prevailing attitudes make it 
extremely difficult for a defendant to be brought to, and convicted, at trial, regardless of 
how well crafted the substantive law is.’180 
 
There is serious complaint to be had with the jury as a decision-maker in rape trials. If the 
jury is to give expression to community standards infused by rape mythology and 
erroneous assumptions, then jury verdicts may be prejudiced and in contravention of the 
law which is unacceptable. It is therefore important to discuss whether other measures can 
diminish the potential legal impact of negative social attitudes amongst jurors. 
Accordingly, the scope to counter juror prejudice is discussed in next chapter.  
 
 
                                                          
176 Finch and Munro (n 1) at 315 
177 Carline and Gunby (n 33) at 245 
178 Ibid 
179 See earlier at 2.1(b) 
180 Cowan (n 62) at 166 
 43 
3. The Scope to Counter the Influence of Prejudicial Attitudes 
in Jury Decisions in Scotland 
 
The previous chapter demonstrates that where attrition occurs on consideration of the 
evidence by the jury in a rape case, an acquittal may be a result of the influence of 
prejudicial social attitudes upon jury decision-making. This chapter therefore discusses 
different counter measures which might be prescribed to enhance the quality and 
impartiality of juror decision-making in rape trials. The potential of the collaborative 
process of deliberation to operate as a safeguard is discussed, in addition to both the need 
for the wider education of society and the scope for education of jurors within the 
parameters of the adversarial structure. The chapter finishes by considering other possible 
avenues, which would depart from the traditional justice model in Scotland. 
 
3.1 Deliberation as a Safeguard 
 
The collective process of deliberation is often regarded as an important safeguard against 
prejudicial and erroneous decision-making by the jury. Whilst the jury is not externally 
accountable for their decision,1 ‘throughout their deliberations jurors remain accountable 
or answerable to each other and it can be argued that this process of jury deliberation in 
itself encourages jurors to put aside their individual biases’. 2  This coincides with a 
conceptualisation of the jury as an educative institution, which remains a frequently 
reiterated justification for the jury across the common law world. As the NZLC stated, 
‘through juror participation in trials involving allegations of sexual offending, the 
stereotypical thinking and myths referred to are more likely to be identified, challenged 
and debunked’.3 
 
A distinct feature of the Scottish jury is that it follows a simple majority verdict rule. 
Simultaneously, there is no timing requirement upon deliberation in Scotland. This can be 
contrasted with procedural requirements in other jurisdictions whereby, although the 
requirement of unanimity may have been relaxed, juries are required to deliberate for 
minimum periods of time before a weighted majority verdict can be allowed.4  
 
                                                        
1 For a classic discussion see JD Jackson, ‘Making juries accountable’ (2002) 50(3) Am J Comp Law 477 
2 Ibid at 482 
3 NZLC, Juries in Criminal Trials Part One: A Discussion Paper (NZLC PP32, 1998) at para 196 
4 For example, two hours in England and Wales, and Ireland and four hours in New Zealand 
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The simple majority basis for a verdict and lack of timing requirement for this to be 
reached is likely to reduce the effectiveness of the deliberative process. The High Court of 
Australia has said of jury verdicts: 
A majority verdict… is analogous to an electoral process in that jurors cast 
their votes relying on their individual convictions… the necessity of a 
consensus of all jurors, which flows from the requirement of unanimity, 
promotes deliberation and provides some insurance that the opinions of each of 
the jurors will be heard and discussed. Thereby, it reduces the danger of ‘hasty 
and unjust verdicts. 5 
 
However, the reality of a system with a requirement of a weighted majority in a rape trial 
is that, as has been indicated in England, it may well only require three individual jurors on 
the jury of twelve who strongly adhere to rape myths to prevent a conviction.6 To this 
extent, the existence of a simple majority in Scotland may help alleviate biases and 
prejudices, as the role of an individual juror is likely to be less decisive than where a 
requirement of unanimity or weighted majority exists.7  
 
However, significantly detracting from this assessment within the context of a rape trial, is 
the fact that negative social attitudes are unlikely to be held by only one juror. The role of 
the individual juror will be accentuated under the Scottish Government’s current proposal 
to increase the number of juror votes required for a conviction from eight to ten of the 
fifteen jurors empanelled.8 The size of the Scottish jury is noticeably larger than more 
common panels of nine or twelve jurors in other jurisdictions and, of itself, might be 
presented as a counterbalance against prejudicial views amongst individual jurors. 9 
However, the actual significance of jury size generally is unconfirmed.10  
 
The extent of change that might occur through the process of collective deliberation is also 
uncertain. 11  Indeed, evidence exists which suggests that the pre-deliberation views of 
individual jurors are predictive of the final jury decision.12 This is corroborated by a recent                                                         
5 Cheatle v R (1993) 177 CLR 541 at para 7 
6 J Temkin and B Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (2008) at 178 
7 P Duff, ‘The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar Institution’ (1999) 62 LCP 173 at 184 
8 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill 2013 s.70(2) (introduced 20 June 2013) 
9 See Scottish Government, The Modern Scottish Jury in Criminal Trials (2008) at para 7.5 
10 Further most studies have examined the differences were between 6 and 12 member juries, for discussion see M Saks 
and M Marti ‘A meta-analysis of the effects of jury size’ (1997) 21 Law and Human Behaviour 451 
11 J Finn, E Mcdonald and Y Tinsley, ‘Identifying and Qualifying the Decision-Maker: the Case for Specialisation’ in E 
McDonald and Y Tinsley (eds), From "Real Rape" to Real Justice : Prosecuting Rape in New Zealand (2011) 221 at 
234 
12 M Sandys and C Dillehay, ‘First-ballot votes, predeliberation dispositions, and final verdicts in jury trials’ (1995) 
19(2) Law and Human Behaviour 175 
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simulated rape trial study by Ellison and Munro.13 Across the twenty-seven mock juries, 
with an acquittal rate of approximately 81%, approximately half of the participating jurors 
ultimately voted in line with their initial preference for acquittal or conviction.14 Given that 
34% of the mock jurors had commenced the deliberations undecided, the share of jurors 
who having stated an initial verdict preference, changed their position over the 
deliberations, was 14%.15  
 
The scope of collective deliberation to act as a ‘check on errors and biases’ may also be 
limited to ‘where a minority of jurors subscribe to the particular prejudice or bias 
involved’.16 This argument must be viewed in the context of the research to the effect that 
pre-existing attitudes about rape and rape victims affect judgments more than the facts of 
the given case or the testimony of the complainer. 17  It must simultaneously be 
acknowledged that the documented prevalence of negative social attitudes within the 
general community, may both underestimate their prevalence and the extent to which 
different individual beliefs held by jurors may exert a cumulative effect.18 Although only a 
minority of a given population might support a specific belief, research in the USA 
indicates that the majority of the individuals subscribe to at least one rape myth. 19 
Furthermore: 
Jurors with a strong belief in rape myths… are likely to express their 
stereotypical views in the course of the jury’s deliberations, giving them 
prominence and potential influence on those members who might not 
otherwise have looked at the case from that point of view. Just as defence 
counsel may ‘prime’ the stereotypes of those already endorsing them, biased 
members of the jury may channel the interpretation of the evidence as a whole 
in a direction that undermines the complainant’s position. 20 
                                                        
13 L Ellison and VE Munro, ‘Getting to (not) guilty: examining jurors' deliberative processes in, and beyond, the context 
of a mock rape trial’ (2010) 30(1) LS 74 
14 Ibid at 86  
15 Ibid  
16 Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11) at 235 
17 See earlier at 1.3 
18 See KM Edwards and others, ‘Rape Myths: History, Individual and Institutional-Level Presence, and Implications for 
Change’ (2011) 65(11-12) Sex Roles 761 at 769; for research illustrating that attitudinal surveys may underestimate 
the extent of negative social amongst mock jurors see L Ellison and VE Munro, ‘A Stranger in the Bushes, or an 
Elephant in the Room? Critical Reflections Upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study’ 
(2010) 13(4) New Crim L Rev 781 
19 A Buddie and A Miller,  ‘Beyond Rape Myths: A More Complex View of Perceptions of Victims’ (2001) 45 Sex 
Roles 130 
20 Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 178 
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Thus, in other jurisdictions, it has been concluded that ‘it is likely that in sexual 
violence cases a majority of individual jurors will believe common myths and 
stereotypes – and as a rule of thumb, “majority wins”’.21  
 
Indeed, in the Ellison and Munro study mentioned above, with an 81% acquittal rate, there 
was a shift away from a conviction across the majority of the mock juries by the time 
deliberations had concluded. In addition, those jurors who were initially undecided as to 
verdict were significantly more likely to vote not guilty in the final poll.22 A further USA 
study illustrative of the ‘majority rule’ phenomenon, showed that in only 5% of trials did 
the minority viewpoint, revealed in the first ballot taken, ultimately prevail. 23 
Simultaneously, where the minority view does prevail, it is more likely to be favourable to 
accused. Approximately three quarters of the trials involved an initial minority persuading 
majorities to shift to acquittal, illustrating that ‘it is easier to raise a reasonable doubt than 
to eliminate a reasonable doubt’.24 This asymmetrical effect is mirrored at individual mock 
juror level in the Ellison and Munro study, where ‘a sizable minority of jurors who 
indicated a guilty verdict at the start of deliberations ultimately voted not guilty… only one 
juror shifted from a preliminary not guilty position to one of guilty at the close of the 
deliberation process’.25  
 
In addition, research illustrates that collective deliberation may exacerbate bias, a 
phenomenon known as ‘group polarisation’.26 This essentially means that decisions made 
by a group tend to be more extreme than those made by an individual, with the direction of 
the shift determined by the position initially preferred by the majority of the individuals.27 
This indicates that: 
[I]f the majority of jurors in a given case are at least mildly accepting of rape 
myths, such beliefs are more likely to be perceived as socially acceptable and 
arguments consistent with rape myths more likely to be exchanged in the 
course of the jury’s deliberations.28  
                                                        
21 Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11) at 235 
22 Ellison and Munro (n 13) at 83 
23 VP Hans, ‘Deliberation and Dissent: 12 Angry Men Versus the Empirical Reality of Juries’ (2007) 82 Chi-Kent L 
Rev 579 at 584 
24 Ibid  
25 Ellison and Munro (n 13) at 83 
26 R Brown, Group processes (1999); F Robbennolt, ‘Evaluating juries by comparison to judges: A benchmark for 
judging?’ (2005) 32 Fla St U L Rev 469 at 501 
27 B Krahé and J Temkin, ‘Addressing the Attitude Problem in Rape Trials: Some Proposals and Methodological 
Considerations’ in MAH Horvath and JM Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking (2009) 301 at 314 
28 Ibid 
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The chances of an acquittal are increased relative to the odds that a single juror 
would have acquitted the accused.29  
 
Other research, examining the effect of the probability of conviction upon deliberation, 
further substantiates the suggestion that juries can be more biased than the individual jurors 
of which they are comprised.  It has been found that in cases where the probability of 
conviction is more finely balanced, this may accentuate the sensitivity of the collective 
jury to biasing information.30 Within the context of a rape trial, where the evidence is 
frequently ‘finely balanced’, and it is reasonable to expect that jurors may subscribe to 
biases arising from rape myths, it has been argued that ‘the collective deliberation process 
will not assist juries to overcome problems associated with bias in the decision making 
process’.31 
 
Empirical reality illustrates that the effect of deliberation as a mechanism to address 
prejudicial decision-making is not reliable, but rather contingent upon task, group and 
group member factors. 32 However, in assessing the extent to which deliberation is an 
effective countermeasure, a reasonable conclusion is that ‘in sexual cases the task is such 
that reliance on the collective process to address biases and errors in decision-making 
would be unsound’.33 
 
The lack of certainty that deliberation is an effective safeguard simultaneously undermines 
the conceptualisation of the jury as an educative institution. It would appear to place undue 
weight on the deliberation process as a protective measure, and an unrealistic onus upon 
individual jurors. Indeed, such a conceptualisation appears to be naively optimistic, in light 
of the evidence that participating in the collective decision-making process does not 
necessarily mediate juror bias in a rape trial and may even have an exacerbatory effect. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
29 Ibid 
30 NL Kerr, KE Niedermeier and MF Kaplan, ‘Bias in jurors vs bias in juries: New evidence from the SDS perspective’ 
(1999) 80(1) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 70; NL Kerr, RJ MacCoun and GP Kramer, 
‘Bias in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups’ (1996) 103(4) Psychological Review 687 
31 Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11) at 234 
32 Ibid  
33 Ibid  
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3.2 Attitudinal Change at Societal Level 
 
Across many jurisdictions, the need for attitudinal change at societal level has been 
regarded as the necessary precursor to legal change in rape law.34 Indeed, there is a strong 
consensus in Scotland that improved public awareness and understanding about the reality 
and nature of sexual offending is the necessary pre-requisite to decreasing attrition.35 The 
need to diminish the legal impact of these negative societal attitudes, reflected amongst 
jurors, increasingly informs academic comment, prosecutorial and political discourses. 
This recognition within political dialogue in Scotland acknowledges that legislative reform 
must be accompanied by a simultaneous strategic policy effort to address negative social 
attitudes amongst the public, from which jurors are empanelled.36 Recently, in recognising 
that removing the requirement for corroboration is not a ‘panacea for rape victims’ and 
will not of itself ‘solve the problem of Scotland’s low conviction rate for rape’ Scotland’s 
Justice Secretary again focused on the need to ‘change attitudes’.37 
 
The Scottish Government funded the RCS national campaign entitled ‘This is Not an 
Invitation to Rape Me’, launched in October 2008, to challenge myths across the four 
themes of intimacy, dress, relationships and drinking. 38  An external evaluation of the 
campaign found it had been successful in stimulating public debate, with 98% of those 
interviewed agreeing that the campaign tackled an important issue, and 61% stating that it 
would prompt them to consider their own attitudes towards rape. 39 While this creates 
optimism for the role of targeted public education campaigns, this is, of course, not the 
same thing as making a difference to actual cases. As has been acknowledged in other 
jurisdictions, ‘the goal of a public education campaign is long term, and as such, little short 
term change to juror deliberations is likely to eventuate’.40 
 
                                                        
34 For a range of national perspectives see C McGlynn and VE Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: International and 
Comparative Perspectives (2011) Intro and Pt.3 
35 COPFS, Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006); S Cowan 'All Change or Business as 
Usual? Reforming the Law of Rape in Scotland' in McGlynn and Munro, Rethinking Rape Law (n 34) 154; S 
Brindley and M Burman, ‘Meeting the challenge? Responding to rape in Scotland’ in N Westmarland and G Ganjoli 
(eds), International Approaches to Rape (2012) 147 
36 See Scottish Government, Sexual Offences (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum (2008) at paras 9-27; Brindley and 
Burman (n 35) at 162-163 
37 ‘Corroboration “not panacea for rape victims”, says Kenny MacAskill’ BBC News Scotland (Scotland, 4 March 2013) 
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-21664871> accessed 30 July 2013 
38 See RCS, This is not an invitation to rape me campaign <http://www.thisisnotaninvitationtorapeme.co.uk/> accessed 
30 July 2013 
39 Progressive, This is not an invitation to rape me: Campaign Evaluation (2009) < 
http://www.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/workspace/publications/TINAITRM-final-evaluation.pdf> accessed 30 July 
2013 at 19-22 
40 Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11) at 241 
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It is self evident that societal enlightenment is the key. However, within this prescription 
the prognosis of commentators across varying jurisdictions for imminent attitudinal change 
is bleak. 41 In the USA, Dripps conveys a deep skepticism that ‘popular opinion’ will 
homogenise with ‘elite opinion’ in the near future, stating ‘it would be a bright eyed 
optimist indeed who expects a sudden sea-change in popular attitudes’.42 Whilst attitudinal 
change may be viewed as a pre-requisite for legal change, the necessary shift in attitudes 
will be an incremental and ongoing cultural evolution. Public education is thus a long-term 
goal, and offering it as a solution can create only the illusion of problem solving in the 
short term. In lieu of any immediate impact on decision-making in criminal trials, there is a 
need for more immediate solutions.  
 
3.3 Educating the Jury 
 
Whilst jury education in the long-term may be achieved through educational initiatives 
designed to target social attitudes at societal level, there is a question of what can be done 
in the interim to educate jurors in Scotland.43 However, the immediate challenge is that, 
within the adversarial system, the opportunities for jury education are strictly limited.44 
Within these parameters, the two educational initiatives that have assumed increasing 
prominence are the potential role of judicial direction upon ‘rape myths’ and expert 
evidence. Both strategies have attracted controversy, and this section explores the extent to 
which these educative measures may help in the immediate courtroom.  
 
3.3(a) Judicial Direction 
 
It has been argued that it should be compulsory in Scotland for judicial charges to include 
an instruction to jurors to disregard personal prejudices.45 Yet, it seems doubtful what this 
would achieve; and of course, individuals who hold prejudicial views may not recognise 
they are prejudiced. 46 Evidence strongly suggests that jurors’ prior beliefs affect their 
verdicts irrespective of clear instructions to ignore these predispositions.47                                                         
41 See eg. J Jordan, ‘Silencing rape, silencing women’ in JM Brown and S Walklate (eds), Handbook of Sexual 
Violence (2011) 253 at 277-279; Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11) at 241; D Dripps, ‘After Rape Law: Will the 
Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault’ (2008) 41 Akron L Rev 957 
42 Dripps (n 41) at 973 
43 See eg. COPFS (n 35) at para 8.66 
44 Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 165 
45 PR Ferguson, ‘The criminal jury in England and Scotland: the confidentiality principle and the investigation of 
impropriety’ (2006) 10(3) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 180 at 202-203 
46 See earlier at 1.3 
47 PW English and BD Sales, ‘A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the Comprehension of Jury Instructions’ (1997) 3(2-
3) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 381; KA Carlson and JE Russo, ‘Biased interpretation of evidence by mock 
jurors’ (2001) 7(2) Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 91 
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However, there may be scope for extended judicial direction, including more specific 
instructions targeting ‘rape myths’ relevant to the particular case. Recognition of the 
pervasiveness of common rape stereotyping means judges in England are now permitted to 
include, in their summing up to the jury, a warning about approaching the evidence with 
any pre-formed assumptions. Such instructions may pertain to, for example, avoiding 
judgments based on stereotypes, avoiding assumptions as to late reporting or where there is 
an absence of force or threat of force.48 The new Crown Court Bench Book,49 which sets 
out a series of illustrative directions that judges can use as templates, provides 
‘unequivocal and welcome recognition of the malign impact that stereotypes and myths 
can have in this area of the law’.50 Indeed, it seemed at one point that something similar 
was on the Scottish political agenda, following the 2011 Scottish National Party Manifesto 
commitment to introduce judicial directions in sexual offence cases around delayed 
reporting and a lack of physical resistance.51 However, to date this strategy has yet to 
progress beyond that initial statement of intent.52 
 
It would seem that, if a move towards judicial instruction were to gather momentum, then 
there is a need to be attentive to lessons from south of the border. The English examples 
are not without their problems; and further consideration does not lend itself to a 
recommendation of the wholesale transplantation of such specimen directions. A 
significant criticism leveled against the Crown Court Bench Book illustrations is one of 
‘comprehensibility’.53 The complicated syntax, coupled with the use of vocabulary likely 
to be outwith that of the average juror, may render the directions incomprehensible to the 
average juror. It is probable that in the absence of clear and understandable instruction 
concerning rape myths, jurors will default to their existing assumptions.54 The implication 
for Scotland is that judicial directions must be carefully drafted to ensure they are clear and 
simple and minimise the risk of ambiguity.55 
                                                         
48 Judicial Studies Board (JSB), Crown Court Bench Book – Directing the Jury (2010) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Training/benchbook_criminal_2010.pdf> Accessed 30th 
July 2013 at ch.17 
49 Ibid 
50 J Temkin, ‘"And Always Keep A-Hold of Nurse, For Fear of Finding Something Worse": Challenging Rape Myths in 
the Courtroom’ (2010) 13(4) New Crim L Rev 710 at 720-721 
51 Scottish National Party (SNP), Manifesto 2011 < http://votesnp.com/campaigns/SNP_Manifesto_2011_lowRes.pdf> 
accessed 30 July 2013 at 19  
52 Despite the fact that major pieces of criminal justice legislation have been passed during this administration. 
53  Temkin (n 50) at 721-724. This criticism sits alongside the research which shows that jurors have difficulty 
understanding judicial instruction – see earlier at 2.1(b) 
54 Ibid at 723 
55 Ibid at 728 for an example of how a direction upon late reporting might be redrafted to be more comprehensible 
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However, even if ‘comprehensibility’ issues might be tackled in Scotland through the 
introduction of more juror friendly judicial instructions, this does not solve the deeper 
psychological complications. It has been argued that:  
There is the risk of assimilation – that the judge’s instructions will be distorted 
by jurors to conform to their own existing attitudes. It is possible that those 
who adhere strongly to rape myths, who are most in need of being educated, 
will see their stereotypes reinforced rather than questioned by the direction.56  
 
An illustrative example in England for example, intended to warn against prejudicial 
judgments surrounding a complainant’s demeanor, states ‘[t]hey may display visible signs 
of having experienced a trauma or they may not’.57 The ‘myth’ that a genuine complainant 
will necessarily exhibit visible signs of trauma is therefore highlighted at the beginning of 
the sentence, but only countered by the four words ‘or they may not’ at the end of the 
sentence.58 The formulation of this direction may, contrary to intention, ensure that the 
false belief it highlights becomes more rather than less influential, and facilitate 
assimilation. 59  This risk of a counteractive effect is exacerbated where the judge is 
perceived as a highly credible source, which may actually increase acceptance of a false 
belief.60 
 
A further mock jury study by Ellison and Munro provides insight into the potential 
efficacy of judicial instruction.61 The study sought to look at the impact of jury education 
designed to counter myths relating to emotional demeanor, late complaints and failure to 
resist the assailant. In this study the number of mock jurors who reported that it would 
have made a difference to their decision if the complainant had reported the alleged assault 
to the police sooner, was reduced from 58% of jurors in a non-educative condition to 23% 
where the jurors had received judicial instruction.62 Similarly, 60% of mock jurors in the 
non-educative condition said had the compliant appeared more visibly distressed during 
her testimony, it would have influenced their decision, compared to 24% who received 
judicial instruction.63 
                                                         
56 Ibid at 723 
57 Quoted in Ibid at 726 
58 Ibid at 727 
59 Ibid  
60 Ibid at 726 
61 L Ellison and VE Munro, ‘Turning mirrors into windows? Assessing the impact of (mock) juror education in rape 
trials’ (2009) 49(3) BJ Crim 363 
62 Ibid at 371 
63 Ibid at 369 
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However, in the study adherence to the myth that rape victims will resist an attack, and 
incur injury in the process, was much more resolute, and judicial direction was ineffectual 
against this variable.64 88% of the mock jurors who had received no educative guidance 
reported that if the complainant had exhibited signs of physical injury after the alleged rape 
it would have made a difference to their decision, as compared to 80% who had received 
judicial instruction.65  
 
There is also an issue of the relationship between potential efficacy of judicial instructions 
and the timing of delivery. There is some consensus that the early presentation of 
educational guidance in a trial is more conducive to mediating preconceptions amongst 
jurors, which is consistent with story-construction decision-making techniques generally 
accepted as employed by jurors.66 Judicial instructions delivered at the end may come too 
late to impact upon juror assessments of witness credibility. One study suggests that 
directions given later in proceedings, by which point jurors’ views have likely cemented, 
have little or no effect on the verdicts delivered.67 
 
In the Ellison and Munro study mentioned above, whilst positive outcomes for judicial 
instruction in regard to two variables of delayed reporting and calm demeanor, an 
acknowledged limitation was, given the mock trials lasted 75 minutes, ‘the impossibility in 
this mock trial context of replicating the parallel relevant stages in a “real” criminal trial 
that may last for many days or weeks’.68 Indeed, in Scotland the average length of a given 
High Court trial is five days,69 with this protraction providing increased time for jurors’ 
views to have hardened. 
 
Judicial instructions are customarily issued at the close of a trial and in the absence of any 
information to the contrary, it is reasonable to think that an extension to include directions 
to target rape myths in Scotland would be so. Yet, relying solely on a judicial direction to 
‘encapsulate the counterintuitive information sought to be communicated to [the jury] … 
may be too little, too late’.70 Indeed, this may be increasingly probable given that, at the                                                         
64 Ibid at 372 
65 Ibid at 373 
66 Ibid at 377; E Borgida and N Brekke, ‘Expert psychological testimony in rape trials: A social-cognitive analysis’ 
(1988) 55 J Personality and Soc Psych 372 
67 JD Lieberman and J Arndt ,‘Understanding the limits of limiting instructions: Social psychological explanations for 
the failures of instructions to disregard pretrial publicity and other inadmissible evidence’ (2000) 6(3) Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 677 
68 Ellison and Munro (n 61) at 377 
69 Scottish Government (n 9) at para 8.3 
70 I Freckelton, ‘The Syndrome Evidence Phenomenon: Time to Move On?’ in R Roesch, RR Corrado and R Dempster  
(eds), Psychology in the Courts: International Advances in Knowledge (2001) 155 at 176 
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close of the trial, the judge will be primarily concerned with directing the jury upon the law 
and explaining the relevancy of the evidence to the legal ingredients of the charge against 
the accused, so it may be unlikely that much time will be dedicated to ‘rape myths’.71 
Indeed, in the Ellison and Munro study, modelled upon the English process, the judge’s 
summing up was brief, allowing the direction upon myths to assume greater prominence 
than would likely be achieved in a real trial.72  
 
3.3(b) Expert Evidence 
 
A further potential strategy for educating the jury is the use of expert testimony. The 
purpose of general expert testimony73 is to inform jurors of certain phenomena of which 
they may not otherwise be alert to. 74  As Freckelton describes, ‘[i]ts aim is to be 
“mythdispelling” - educative, directed toward enhancing the understanding of the tribunal 
of fact and toward removing from the evaluative process a source of error’.75 Thus, the 
provision of social science data is intended to contextualise the post-assault behavior of a 
complainer which jurors may otherwise perceive as counterintuitive, thus acting as a 
counterweight to standard discrediting strategies employed by defence counsel.76 
 
General expert evidence, whilst the least controversial species of expert evidence,77 is not 
without debate. Previous research has indicated that it may only exert effect upon jurors 
when delivered early in the proceedings, and also significantly, that expert evidence is 
ineffectual where not case-specific.78 This prompted concern that generic expert testimony 
premised upon group data would be unlikely to be utilised by jurors unless explicitly 
connected to the facts of the case at issue. 79 Yet case-specific evidence may risk the 
usurpation of the jury’s function, may be accorded unwarranted epistemic authority and 
have inappropriate ‘spillover effects’ prompting ‘jurors to negatively evaluate evidence 
supporting the defendant’s version of events’.80  
                                                         
71 Temkin (n 50) at 732 
72 Ibid at 731 
73 As distinct from other models of expert evidence that have been deployed in rape cases in other jurisdictions to the 
admission of syndrome and profile evidence in criminal proceedings – see  L Ellison, ’Closing the credibility gap: 
The prosecutorial use of expert witness testimony in sexual assault cases’ (2005) 9(4) International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 239 
74 Ibid at 256-257 
75 I Freckelton, ‘Counterintuitive Evidence’ (1997) 4 Journal of Law and Medicine 303. 
76 Ellison (n 73) at 257-259 
77 For discussion see ibid at 251-260; Ellison and Munro (n 61) at 364-366 
78 Borgida and Brekke (n 66) at 376 
79 N Vidmar and RA Schuller, ‘Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Evidence’ (1989) 52 LCP 133 
80 Ibid at 142; for discussion see T Ward, ‘Usurping the role of the jury? Expert evidence and witness credibility in 
English criminal trials’ (2009) 13(2) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 83 
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A further study found that the effect of the expert testimony addressing various rape myths 
was reversed on cross-examination. 81  That is, mock jurors who heard only the direct 
examination of the expert were less likely to believe that the sexual intercourse was 
consensual and were more likely to vote for a guilty verdict. However, this increase in 
guilty votes was not seen in cases where the expert was exposed to cross-examination by 
the defence. This finding has been presented as a potential weakness to the efficacy of 
general expert testimony,82 but has simultaneously been used to validate the argument that 
expert testimony is not unduly prejudicial to the defendant, as it can be effectively 
countered through cross-examination.83 
 
In contrast to initial research Ellison and Munro recently found non-case specific or 
‘generic’ expert testimony to have some influence upon mock juror decision-making in the 
context of a rape trial. This ‘generic’ approach is to be favoured to the extent it may help 
jurors not to draw inappropriate inferences, yet the study found no evidence that the expert 
testimony invaded the domain of the jury by testifying or appearing to testify indirectly for 
the individual complainant’s veracity.84 
 
Ellison and Munro found that the number of mock jurors who reported that their decision 
would have been affected if the complainant had appeared more visibly distressed during 
her testimony, was diminished from 60% of jurors in the non-education condition to 35% 
amongst those exposed to expert testimony.85 Similarly, the number of mock jurors who 
stated affirmatively that it would have made a difference to their deliberations if the 
complainant had reported the alleged assault to the police sooner, declined from 58% to 
28% with the general expert testimony.86 
 
However, in line with findings upon judicial instruction noted earlier, the use of expert 
evidence against the third variable examined paints a much less optimistic picture. The 
number of mock jurors who reported that it would have influenced their decision if 
complainant had exhibited signs if physical injury after the alleged sexual assault, was 
                                                        
81 N Spanos, S Dubreuil and M Gwynn, ‘The Effects of Expert Testimony Concerning Rape on the Verdicts and Beliefs 
of Mock Jurors’ (1991) 11 Imagination, Cognition and Personality 37 
82 Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 166 
83 KA Lonsway, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Cases Involving Sexual Assault (Violence Against Women Online 
Resources 2005) 
<http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/commissioned/svandexpertwitnesses/svandexpertwitnesses.html> 
accessed 30th July 2012 
84 Finch and Munro (n 61) at 379 
85 Ibid at 369 
86 Ibid at 371 
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88% where the jurors who had received no educative guidance, as compared to 92% who 
were exposed to expert testimony.87  
 
In Scotland, s.5 of the Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004 (‘VW(S)A 2004’), 
inserting a new s.275C into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (‘CP(S)A 1995’), 
was enacted to clarify the admissibility of expert psychological and psychiatric evidence 
on the impact of sexual victimisation.88 S.275C states: 
Expert psychological or psychiatric evidence relating to any subsequent 
behaviour or statement of the complainer is admissible for the purpose of 
rebutting any inference adverse to the complainer’s credibility or reliability as 
a witness which might otherwise be drawn from the behaviour or statement. 
 
It is important to understand the context in which this provision arose. The provision was 
intended to supplant the decision in HM Advocate v Grimmond,89 which had cast doubt on 
the admissibility of expert evidence to explain the gradual disclosure of abuse by a child 
complainer.  It has been suggested that in many child abuse and sexual abuse cases in the 
High Court, it is now routine for the jury to hear evidence from a psychologist in order to 
contextualise any such delay.90 However, the current prosecutorial use of s.275C in rape 
trials where the complainer is an adult female is unclear. 
 
In relation to s.275C, the COPFS recommended ‘evidence should be given about reactions 
demonstrated by samples of the population who have been sexually abused, based on 
research findings, but not about the reactions of the individual complainer’. 91  The 
expectation is evidence may relate to ‘normal’ human behavior, albeit precipitated by 
‘abnormal’ circumstances, such as sexual victimisation.92 It has ben suggested that the 
expert need not have examined the complainer, but could base their evidence on academic 
literature or experimental data about how victims in general behave provided that this is 
‘relating to’ the complainer’s behavior.93  
 
Whilst this may bear the hallmarks of ‘generic’ or non-case specific evidence, the 
provision is intended only to rebut evidence already led which might prompt an                                                         
87 Ibid at 373 
88 See L Sharp and ML Ross, The Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004 (2008) at 55-56 
89 2001 SCCR 708 
90 Author Unknown, ‘Psychiatric evidence in the criminal courts’ 2009 SCL 550 
91 COPFS (n 35) at para 8.78 
92 L Gillespie, ‘Expert Evidence and Credibility’ 2005 SLT (News) 53 at 53 
93 Ibid at 55 
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uninformed adverse inference amongst jurors. The difficulty is that the prosecution must 
predict what adverse inferences the defence may try to invoke in order to be able to 
respond, and this could make it likely that the prosecution will obtain a pre-trial 
psychological or psychiatric report. 94 This is problematic because a complainer has no 
control over whether their records are accessed by the prosecution or the subsequent wider 
circulation of any records.95 A complainer can neither require the prosecution to oppose 
defence application for disclosure, nor influence the intensity of any opposition. 
Accordingly, this process is viewed as a serious invasion of the complainer’s privacy.96 
Furthermore, ‘the use of expert evidence is fraught with difficulties for complainers with 
much scope to be counter productive’, given a report may be likely to end up as defence 
cannon fodder when seeking to demolish the reliability and credibility of the complainer.97 
 
The prosecutorial use of general expert testimony seeks to ‘level the evidentiary playing 
field’,98 however a further concern voiced about the use of expert evidence is the risk of 
degeneration into a ‘battle of experts’. 99  Yet, whilst this concern may be unlikely to 
transpire in Scotland given the inference that s.275C is for exclusive use by the prosecution 
to rebut any adverse evidence,100 with no parallel provision made for the defence to adduce 
expert evidence in rebuttal, this simultaneously could cast doubt over the very fairness of 
such a provision.101  
 
3.3(c) The Limits of Education 
 
The preceding paragraphs describe some of the complex limitations to educative measures 
as a means to disabuse jurors of attitudinal biases. 
 
There is some disagreement over the ability of educational guidance in redressing 
attitudinal biases, thus neutralising the effect of what jurors may perceive as a 
counterintuitive response in the credibility conflict.102 Simultaneously, the tendency has 
been to view expert evidence and judicial instruction as mutually exclusive alternatives;                                                         
94 F Raitt, ‘Independent legal representation for complainers in sexual offence trials: research report for Rape Crisis 
Scotland’ (2010) <http://ww.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/workspace/publications/IndLegalRepReport-2010.pdf> 
accessed 29 July 2013 at para 7.24 
95 Ibid at para 7.24 
96 Ibid 
97 Ibid at para 7.25 
98 Ellison (n 73) at 257 
99 Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 165 
100 Gillespie (n 92) at 54 
101 For criticism of the provision as ‘one sided’ see ibid 
102 In defence see Ellison and Munro (n 61) at 379; for more sceptical appraisals see Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 165-167 
and Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11) at 240 
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yet there is an emerging hypothesis that such educational guidance may be likely to exert 
the greatest impact when both are deployed in conjunction.103  
 
On the basis of the Ellison and Munro study the effect of educational guidance has been 
regarded as promising in relation to minimising negative inferences as to credibility across 
two variables, with fewer educated jurors considering the timing of the complainant’s 
report and emotional demeanour at trial to be significant factors.104 Yet given the study 
created an environment that was more conducive than a real trial to jurors engaging with, 
for example judicial instruction, the results have equally been viewed as disappointing.105 
Indeed, there are those who contend that there is insufficient evidence to support that 
judicial instruction in sexual offences cases would be helpful or effective.106 Furthermore, 
positive results on the issue of non-resistance have not been yielded. Despite their educated 
condition, mock jurors continued to find it difficult to believe the complainant had not 
‘defended herself’, sustained external or internal injuries or traumas, and remained 
‘baffled’ by the lack of corroborative medical evidence.107  This inability of educative 
guidance gives rise to two possibilities. That, either there were inadequacies in the scope or 
wording of the study guidance, which if remedied might exert a more positive impact, or 
that: 
It is possible that expectations of force, injury and resistance are just so deeply 
engrained within the popular imagination that attempts to disavow jurors of 
them through education within the rape trial are likely to meet limited 
success.108  
 
Yet, irrespective of the debate over the efficacy of educational guidance in correcting 
misinformation, a core issue remains that attitudes about how a victim of ‘real rape’ would 
behave form only one side of the distorted prism of ‘rape myths’ through which jurors may 
view the evidence.  It may be that the introduction of educative guidance in rape trials 
represents a ‘pragmatic, defensible and efficient means of redressing at least some of the 
unfounded assumptions and attitudinal biases that prevent too many victims of sexual 
assault from accessing justice’.109 Yet, this leaves open the question of how to address the 
remaining angles of prejudice which may result in jurors disqualifying complainers. Myths                                                         
103 Ellison and Munro (n 61) at 377-378; P Lewis, ‘Expert evidence of delay in complaint in childhood sexual abuse 
prosecutions’ (2006) 10(3) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 157 at 178-179 
104 Ellison and Munro (n 61) at 374 
105 Temkin (n 50) at 731 
106 See eg. E Mcdonald and Y Tinsley, ‘Evidence Issues’ in McDonald and Tinsley (n 11) 279 at 372 
107 Ellison and Munro (n 61) at 373 
108 Ibid at 374 
109 Ibid at 379. Emphasis added. 
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surrounding ‘women cry rape’, consent and victim precipitation are deeply problematic yet 
unlikely to be countered through such means, particularly where the antecedents of these 
attitudes are moralistic and gendered assumptions.110  
 
3.4 Other Measures 
 
There are other strategies that might be explored. For example, out of the repeated failures 
of rape shield provisions comes a call for the introduction of independent legal 
representation for complainers in Scotland,111 which could aid in limiting the extent to 
which the jury have access to prejudicial information. Indeed, the tenability of such an 
innovation is bolstered by the fact that such an initiative has been accommodated within 
other Anglo-American common law jurisdictions, such as Ireland, which are adherent to 
the adversarial tradition.112   
 
Similarly, the continuation of the ‘unreasoned verdict’ which prevails in both the Scottish 
and English jurisdictions remains a continued source of debate and criticism generally.113 
Introducing a requirement that juries give reasons in a bid to improve the quality of 
evidence processing and decision-making in the context of sexual offences has been 
canvassed, although further research is needed to determine the extent to which this could 
be beneficial.114 Equally, in Scotland it has been suggested that the presence of a legally 
qualified assessor in the deliberation room might help prevent jury impropriety.115 Thus: 
[t]he assessor would not be permitted to vote on the verdict, nor to give an 
opinion on the evidence, but would try to ensure that the jury's deliberations 
focused on consideration of the evidence, and that there was minimum 
discussion of irrelevant matters or biased opinions.116  
 
However, it is submitted that the need to introduce such measures to try to counteract the 
adverse impact of social attitudes on jury decision-making in rape trials indicates, as with                                                         
110 Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 166; PN Rumney and RA Fenton, ‘Intoxicated Consent in Rape: Bree and Juror Decision-
Making’ (2008) 71(2) MLR 279 at 290 
111 For this argument see F Raitt, ‘Independent Legal Representation’ in C McGlynn and VE Munro (eds), Rethinking 
Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (2011) 267; F Raitt, ‘Independent Legal Representation in 
Rape Cases: Meeting the Justice Deficit in Adversarial Proceedings' [2009] CLR 729 
112 Ibid. For further recognition that this warrants consideration in the Scottish context see P Duff, 'The Scottish 'rape 
shield': as good as it gets?' (2011) 15(2) Edin LR 218 at 241-242 
113 See Ferguson (n 45); B Erastus-Obilo, Reason Curve, Jury Competence, and the English Criminal Justice System: 
The Case for a 21st Century Approach (2009); Jackson (n 1) 
114 Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 188; for empirical support that this option could reduce the impact of stereotpyes see B 
Krahé, J Temkin and S Bieneck, ‘Schemadriven information processing in judgements about rape’ (2007) 21(5) 
Applied Cognitive Psychology 601 
115 Ferguson (n 45) at 205 
116 Ibid 
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the inadequacies of the deliberation process and limited scope for educating jurors to 
achieve this, the need to re-consider the role of the jury itself in these cases. The problem 
of prejudicial decision-making by jurors in rape trials transcends jurisdictional boundaries 
and distinct features of a jurisdiction’s jury. Accordingly, it is apt to consider whether the 
peer criminal jury, in its broadest sense, is an appropriate decision-making forum in rape 
trials at all. Indeed, the jury has come to be viewed as a uniquely challenging aspect of the 
legal response to rape, particularly because of the limited scope for countering juror 
attitudes.117  
 
3.5 The Jury on Trial 
 
‘Community input’ through the institution of jury in a rape trial may allow the pollution of 
decision-making to the extent that principles of fairness and equity are compromised.118  In 
particular, this thesis has demonstrated that jurors may compromise their impartial position 
by infusing rape mythology with their assessments of a rape complaint, to the extent that 
an acquittal may be based upon grounds other than the accused's factual innocence. To that 
extent, the jury can undermine the authority of the law, and nullify the criminal law’s 
ostensible prohibition of all non-consensual sexual intercourse. 
 
This ‘nullification’ is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the baseline responsibility of 
the justice system to ensure the objective and effective implementation of the law.  The 
impact of the verdict upon the complainer’s life can be profound; and consideration must 
be given to the effect of this form of jury ‘nullification’ upon the complainer. In situations 
where the evidence does objectively point towards the guilt of the accused, and the jury 
still does not convict, the complainer's status is denigrated. 119  This is irrespective of 
conscious disaffection or any intent by the jury to express such denigration, as the effect 
remains the same as the jury is refusing to condemn the accused’s conduct towards the 
complainer.120   
 
Further, whilst a jury’s failure to deliver an impartial verdict in an individual case can 
mean a complainer is re-victimised at the hands of justice system, the impact of that 
individual verdict transcends the immediate confines of the courtroom to become part of a 
                                                        
117 Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11) at 222 
118 Ibid at 250; Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 69 
119 Jackson (n 1) at 509 
120 Ibid  
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more encompassing ‘cycle of blame’ or ‘vicious cycle’.121 This ‘cycle of blame’ suggests 
that jurors’ decisions and verdicts are not only influenced by stereotypic beliefs about rape, 
but that the same rape myths which restrict definitions and limit convictions that have 
contributed to that verdict in the first place, are in turn strengthened and reinforced by 
acquittals. Thus, ‘what comes from a jury in a rape case is more than just a conviction or 
acquittal: the jury decision also contributes to a definition of what constitutes real rape’.122 
For example, if cases deviating from the ‘real rape’ stereotype are more likely to culminate 
in acquittal, this verdict bolsters the widely held view that cases less close to the stereotype 
are not really rape.123  
 
Not only is this troubling in terms of the impact upon individual cases, but if rape myths 
are self-perpetuating and fulfilling through the institution of jury, this will continue to 
frustrate legislative action sought to make the law more inclusive of the realities of rape. 
Indeed, jury attitudes can mean that patterns within criminal justice decision-making, 
become problematically self-justifying in terms of prosecutorial choices. As such, ‘this 
cyclical process of prediction and attrition thus effectively reproduces the systematic 
impunity of certain categories of sexual offender and/or offending’.124  
 
An emergent body of commentators internationally view the jury as an inappropriate 
decision-maker in rape trials.125 This conviction arises not out of antipathy to the jury as an 
institution, but because of the unreliability of the jury within the particular context of rape 
and sexual offences.126 As one commentator describes, abolishing the jury in rape trials is 
necessary as a ‘direct bypass of popular prejudice’.127 
 
Thus, an emerging proposal is that the jury should be replaced by a judge only decision-
making process in rape trials.128 The potential of this option in Scotland is examined in the 
following chapter. 
                                                        
121 HC Sinclair and LE Bourne, ‘Cycle of blame or just world: Effects of legal verdicts on gender patterns in rape-myth 
acceptance and victim empathy’ (1998) 22(4) Psychology of Women Quarterly 575; L Kelly and VE Munro, ‘A 
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(n 27); MAH Horvath and JM Brown, ‘Between a rock and a hard place’ (2010) 23(7) The Psychologist 556 
122 Sinclair and Bourne (n 121) at 577 
123 Temkin and Krahé (n 6) at 70-71; Horvath and Brown (n 121) at 558 
124 Kelly and Munro (n 121) at 295 
125 Dripps (n 41), Finn and Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11); for more cautious support see Krahé and Temkin (n 27) and 
Temkin and Krahé (n 6) 
126 See Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11) 
127 Dripps (n 41) at 977 
128 Dripps (n 41), Finn and Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 11); Krahé and Temkin (n 27); Temkin and Krahé (n 6) 
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4. Re-considering the Role of Juries in Rape Trials in Scotland 
 
This chapter puts forward the case for substituting the jury with an alternative judge based 
decision-making process in Scotland. It argues that this outcome would be in line with the 
institutional responsibility of the criminal justice system to ensure the objective delivery of 
the law in practice, and be more likely to ensure that the cost to the complainer of pursuing 
justice is not re-victimisation. 
 
4.1 Conceptualising an Appropriate Decision-Maker 
 
The criminal justice system has a baseline institutional responsibility to have an effective 
law governing rape and ensure its delivery, yet the evidence strongly indicates that the jury 
is an unreliable, and therefore inappropriate, decision-maker in a rape trial. In considering 
whether a judge based system should replace the jury, it is necessary to assess the extent to 
which this would be an appropriate alternative. As a potential reform it must normatively 
be measured against aims which concentrate on the responsibility of the justice system to 
respond effectively to rape.  
 
There is a growing recognition that improving the conviction rate is, of itself, not a valid 
objective of reform or sole signifier of an effective criminal justice response.1 Rather an 
increase in the conviction rate of the guilty should stem from the more objective 
application of the law in practice, thus pursuing a reduction in biased disqualification of 
complainers and the improved treatment of complainers.2 It is submitted that the relevant 
question is the extent to which the proposed reformed system of judicial decision-making 
may be more conducive to fulfilling these aims. 
 
4.2 Preliminary Considerations 
 
Prior to further discussion of the appropriateness of a judge based decision-making process 
in rape trials, it is prudent to anticipate the conceptual and practical difficulties that might 
arise in response to such a proposal. It is necessary to conciliate potential objections in 
order to present a judicial based system as a viable possibility. 
                                                         
1 See earlier at 1.1(d) 
2 See eg. W Larcombe, 'Falling Rape Conviction Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for Rape Laws' (2011) 
19(1) Fem LS 27 
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4.2(a) ‘Right’ to a Jury Trial 
 
A preliminary issue is the procedural legitimacy of substituting the jury with a judge based 
decision-making process.  
 
In contrast to some other jurisdictions there is no right to a jury trial in Scotland.3 The 
jury’s attendance is a product of prosecutorial choice of solemn procedure, rather than the 
choice of the accused. The only limitation upon prosecutorial choice of procedure is often 
the limits of the jurisdiction and sentencing powers of a court. In Scotland, if a case may be 
heard under either solemn or summary procedure, the accused has no say in the matter. 
However, certain stipulated offences are excluded from prosecutorial discretion. In 
particular, rape is triable on indictment exclusively in the High Court under solemn 
jurisdiction.4  
 
Given that solemn procedure dictates the use of a jury, this may then generate confusion 
leading some to conceptualise this statutory requirement within the language of a ‘right’. 
Indeed, in Scotland, jury trials have been described as the ‘unrestricted right of anyone 
charged under solemn procedure’.5 Yet, this conceptualisation of a ‘right’ is difficult, if not 
misconceived and misplaced. It is not a right in any conventional sense. It seems axiomatic 
that, for it to be a right, the corollary would be the right to waive trial by the jury, yet there 
exists no such option other than where the accused pleads guilty. Any outward appearance 
of an unrestricted right dissimulates no more than procedural convention. 
 
Provision for the trial of rape cases by a judge, or panel of judges, sitting without a jury 
could be made by an Act of the Scottish Parliament. It would be competent for the 
Parliament to legislate to this effect, without engaging in any deep-rooted ‘constitutional’ 
debate. Similarly, as the Scottish Government has recently acknowledged, it is  ‘possible to 
have a fair trial in serious cases without consideration by a jury’. 6  Perhaps, within 
justifying the procedural legitimacy, the most substantial challenge would be creating the 
appropriate boundaries;7 after that it is submitted that other procedural challenges are not 
logistically unsurmountable.8                                                         
3 A Hardie, ‘The Lockerbie trial’ 1998 SLT (News) 9 
4 CP(S)A 1995 s.3(6)  
5 PW Ferguson, ‘The Modern Criminal Jury’ 2008 SLT (News) 229 at 236 
6 Scottish Government, The Modern Scottish Jury in Criminal Trials (2008) at 31 
7 The decision would be with the legislature as to whether the provision should adopt a blanket policy, whereby all 
rape and serious sexual offences heard on indictment would be heard by judges alone or whether only in cases where, 
for example, cause could be shown by the prosecution or, in ensuring equality of arms, the defence. Space does not 
permit full discussion of where the exact parameters of legislations might be set. The difficulty would be where to set 
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A jury is not necessary to secure a fair trial. Coupled with this, is the recognition that the 
institution of the jury is as much about the public interest as the interest of the accused. 
The Scottish Government has alluded to ‘the benefits derived for society as a whole in 
securing a fair trial by peers’.9 But one must readily question within the context of rape 
trials, the extent to which society is deriving benefit or a ‘fair trial’ from the use of the 
jury. Unlike the accused, the complainer has no rights under the process.10 Yet in an age of 
growing opposition to this orthodoxy, might it be acknowledged that, jurors’ ‘acceptance 
of rape myths prevents victim’s from receiving a “fair trial” by impartial decision 
makers’11 and this does not benefit society. 
 
4.2(b) Democratic Legitimacy of the Conviction and Protection of Accused 
 
The retention of the jury might be justified on the view of it as an institution that 
legitimises the criminal justice system. As has been described, the support given to the 
notion of trial by jury in Scotland has ‘nothing to do with the effectiveness of jury trial as a 
means of ascertaining the truth of the prosecution’s allegations and everything to do with 
the appearance of democratic legitimacy of the conviction’.12  
 
One response to this might be to suggest that it is certainly a good thing that support for the 
jury does not rest on effectiveness in rape trials, as this would be seriously misguided. 
Awareness of the fact that less than 1% of individuals proceeded against in Scottish courts 
each year have their cases determined by a jury, is presumably why the argument is 
restricted to the appearance of democratic legitimacy. The argument prevaricates, of 
course, on the question of the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of the convictions of those 
convicted out of the remaining 99%.  
 
Yet, where a serious crime is indicted, the use of a jury trial is deeply ingrained within 
democratic ethos. Accordingly, whilst it has been argued above that the retention of the 
jury in rape trials cannot be justified on the basis of an accused’s right, possible resistance                                                                                                                                                                        
dividing lines. One possible solution would be to create a rule whereby all charges brought under the SO(S)A 2009 
would be tried by judge alone.  
8 Where non-sexual trials are also included on the indictment it is suggested that this could be accommodated with the 
existing separation of trials procedure, whereby the defence could be permitted to apply for a separation to allow non-
sexual charges on the indictment to be tried before a jury. 
9 Scottish Government (n 6) at 5 
10 M Mackarel, F Raitt and S Moody, Briefing Paper on Legal Issues and Witness Protection in Criminal Cases  
(Scottish Executive Central Research Unit 2001) 
11 M Torrey, ‘When will we be believed-rape myths and the idea of a fair trial in rape prosecutions’ (1990) 24 UC 
Davis L Rev 1013 at 1016 
12 Ferguson (n 5) at 235 
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takes on a different look when jury trial is framed as a protection for the accused.13 If a 
judge was permitted to make a determination, ‘the fairness of such proceedings might be 
questioned, having regard to the consequences for the accused, of being convicted and 
sentenced to life imprisonment on the basis of one person’s assessment of the evidence 
against him or her’.14  
 
The obvious way to mitigate the concern of one judge deciding the fate of an individual in 
a rape trial, is to use a panel of judges.15 However, others might regard this solution as 
avoiding the real issue, the argument being that ‘serious crimes merit lengthy jail 
sentences; decisions as to whether guilt is established on these charges should be made by 
one’s fellow citizens and not by a judge or a panel of judges’.16 It flows that, whilst under 
summary jurisdiction determinations of guilt are made by the Justice of the Peace or 
Sheriff alone, in a High Court rape trial, where the determination may condemn the 
accused to a lengthy prison sentence, then one judge or a panel should not make the 
determination. 
 
However, even if the above argument is prima facie convincing, it is weakened to the 
extent it might be considered conceptually misplaced. Indeed:  
[S]uch a distinction is artificial as there is no intrinsic difference in deciding a 
case were the punishment could be six months imprisonment and a case where 
the punishment is ten years imprisonment. The difference is solely the type of 
offence, with the concept of guilt staying the same.17  
If judges are deemed competent to make determinations in less serious offences, then 
surely this extends to more ‘serious’ cases, as the concept of guilt is a constant. 
Accordingly there is nothing in principle that precludes a judicial determination of 
innocence or guilt in rape trials. Rather, the salient question is whether, as this chapter 
discusses, there are reasons that within this context a judge based decision-making system 
would be more appropriate. 
 
Furthermore, where the argument is concerned with protecting the accused in a rape trial, 
then a judge based system may serve more legitimately this purpose, as a judge will give 
reasons for a decision, which will be made public and if those reasons are unsound in law,                                                         
13  Basically that, in Scotland, the accused is protected by the rule that no sentence in excess of twelve months 
imprisonment can be imposed without either an admission of guilt (by way of a plea) or a jury trial 
14 Scottish Government (n 6) at 32 
15 A panel of three would ensure that a majority verdict could be delivered - see Scottish Government (n 6) at 32  
16 Ferguson (n 5) at 235 
17 P Fitzpatrick, ‘The British Jury: An Argument for the Reconstruction of the Little Parliament’ [2010] 6 Cambridge 
Student Law Review 1 at 10 
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that verdict can be set aside upon appeal.18 This would have the advantage of injecting an 
element of realism in to criminal appeals which may have been a long time lacking.19 
Indeed, internationally, courts have traditionally afforded utmost deference to jury 
verdicts.20 Similarly the Scottish High Court is notoriously disinclined to grant appeals on 
the basis of an ‘unreasonable jury verdict’. 21  Albeit that the appellate judiciary are 
constrained in intervening with jury verdicts as a lack of reasons makes any appeal court 
poorly equipped to review the basis for that verdict, the present extent of that reluctance 
has been stated to risk compromising the compliancy of Scotland’s current jury verdict 
system with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).22  
 
A judicial verdict in reasoned format would appear a ‘legitimate’ verdict, capable of being 
defended by logic and justification and realistically capable of being appealed, thus 
offering an accused greater protection. Further, objection can be brought to the themes of 
‘protection’ and ‘legitimacy’ of jury verdicts through reference to a study, which explored 
the perceptions of two-hundred-and-seventy-seven real jurors from twenty-five juries 
immediately after they heard sexual assault trials. 23 Disconcertingly, some jurors were 
‘confused, unclear, uncertain’ as to the verdict that they had just delivered, and in less than 
a quarter of the trials were all participating jurors even able to correctly state the verdict 
that had been delivered.24 In contrast to the view of the jury as legitimising the justice 
system, the jury’s current operation, which essentially permits jurors to convict or acquit 
against the evidence tendered in a rape trial without reason, deprives the criminal justice 
system of its virtue.25 
 
4.2(c) Public Support for the Jury 
 
The shared feature across the common law world, to which Scotland comprises no 
exception, appears to be the significance invested in trial by jury, and the confidence in the 
criminal justice system which the institution generates.26 Of course, the public perception 
of the jury is incongruous with the very small actual proportion of cases determined in this 
manner.                                                         
18 J Law ‘Criminal Jury Trials’ 1967 SLT (News) 173 at 174 
19 Ibid 
20 JD Jackson, ‘Making juries accountable’ (2002) 50(3) Am J Comp Law 477 at 488 
21 See P Duff, ‘The compatibility of jury verdicts with article 6: Taxquet v Belgium’ (2011) 15(2) Edin LR 246 (CASE 
COMMENT) at 250 
22 Ibid 
23 J Cashmore and L Trimboli, ‘Child sexual assault trials: a survey of juror perceptions’ (2006) 
24 Ibid at 12 
25 B Erastus-Obilo, Reason Curve, Jury Competence, and the English Criminal Justice System: The Case for a 21st 
Century Approach (2009) at 61 
26 P Duff, ‘The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar Institution’ (1999) 62 LCP 173 at 176 
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A recent comprehensive review of available material upon the community reaction to, and 
public attitudes toward, the institution of the criminal jury in the UK found attitudes clearly 
to be positive.27 However, it was concluded that this may be attributable to an abstract 
attraction to the general notion of ‘community input’, rather than any concrete evidence as 
to the effectiveness of the jury as decision-maker.28 Yet, as this thesis has argued, it is the 
very aspect of ‘community input’ that makes the jury unreliable in rape trials. 
 
The viability of removing the jury in rape cases as a means of improving justice is, to some 
extent, dependent on the opposition with which the proposal would be met. However, there 
is a legitimate question as to the degree to which high public opinion of the jury should 
figure in a decision as to whether to remove the jury. As has been noted, albeit in a 
different context: 
[P]ublic opinion itself - even if it can be discovered by reliable research 
methods - may be founded on incomplete information, misconceptions or the 
failure to consider certain arguments. To rely on public opinion as the 
benchmark of public confidence is therefore unwise.29  
A salient point is then that, whilst the jury may enjoy high public opinion, there is the 
countervailing consideration of the low public confidence in the legal response to rape and 
treatment of complainers. 30 Indeed, research indicates that 42% of the Scottish public 
believe that the legal system automatically takes an unsympathetic view towards rape 
victims.31  
 
A suggestion to remove the jury in rape trials may initially seem liable to provoke public 
concern. It appears predictable that the public’s intuitive response would be to defend the 
continued use of the jury, albeit this might be on a relatively uninformed basis. This can be 
contrasted with the arguably more informed opinions of those directly involved in the 
reporting and prosecutorial stages of rape allegations in other jurisdictions, where there is 
increased support for ending the jury’s role in these cases.32 The real question would be,                                                         
27 JV Roberts and M Hough, ‘Public Attitudes to the Criminal Jury: A Review of Recent Findings’ (2011) 50(3) The 
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 247 
28 Ibid at 259 
29 A Ashworth, ‘Exploring the integrity principle in evidence and procedure’ in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds), Essays 
for Colin Tapper (2003) 107 at 111 
30 See eg. F Raitt, ‘Independent legal representation for complainers in sexual offence trials: research report for Rape 
Crisis Scotland’ (2010) <http://ww.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/workspace/publications/IndLegalRepReport-2010.pdf> 
accessed 29 July 2013 at para 1.07 
31 B Cameron and L Murphy, Campaign Evaluation Report Rape Crisis Scotland “This is not an invitation to Rape 
Me”: Research Report (2008) at 13 
32 For example, in New Zealand two-thirds of the Crown Solicitors and 90% of police participants expressed the view 
that juries should not hear sexual violence cases, see E Mossman and others, Responding to Sexual Violence: 
Environmental scan of New Zealand Agencies (2009) at 116 
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whether, irrespective of the immediate outcry, the decision would prompt the loss of public 
confidence, or might this be countered by a greater public confidence in the legal response 
to rape. 
 
4.3 A Judge Based Decision-Making Process 
 
The question now to be addressed is whether trial by a judge based system would be more 
conducive to the objective administration of the law, thereby reducing the unwarranted 
disqualification and re-traumatisation of complainers and in turn improving conviction 
rates. 
 
4.3(a) Reducing Disqualification 
 
Firstly, an appropriate aim to assess a judge based decision-making process against, is 
whether this would deliver the law more effectively in practice and be more conducive to 
improving the legal ‘story’ of rape.33 
 
Dispute thus centers over the role of the jury as ‘fact finder’. The NZLC considered that: 
[T]he basic issue in cases involving allegations of sexual offending is whether 
the defendant or the complainant should be believed. The jury is just as well 
equipped to determine that matter as a judge or an expert.34  
Yet, as this thesis has demonstrated this assertion underestimates the extent to which 
serious complaint can be had with the jury as fact finder in rape cases. Thus, a 
determinative question to be asked is whether the proposed alternative of a judge based 
process would be more empirically likely to reduce the re-victimisation of complainers 
through minimising the denial of instances of non-consensual sexual intercourse as rape. 
 
In other jurisdictions there appears to be a general expectation that a judge based system, 
would improve conviction rates because experienced judges would be more likely to make 
a forensic and dispassionate analysis of the evidence, better positioned to draw appropriate 
inferences and less likely to be manipulated by defence counsel.35                                                         
33 Larcombe (n 2) at 35 
34 NZLC, Juries in Criminal Trials Part One: A Discussion Paper (NZLAC PP32, 1998) at para 196 
35 See Mossman and others (n 32) at 116; B Krahé and J Temkin, ‘Addressing the Attitude Problem in Rape Trials: 
Some Proposals and Methodological Considerations’ in MAH Horvath and JM Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging 
Contemporary Thinking (2009) 301 at 312; in qualitative interviews twenty-one out of twenty-four judges and 
barristers though conviction rates would increase with judge only trials, although note that this did not correspond 
always to the view that the jury should be abolished - see J Temkin and B Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: 
A Question of Attitude (2008) at 179 and ch. 6 
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However, the hypothesis that judge only trials would be successful in reducing the legal 
impact of rape stereotypes on the decision-making process has yet to be subjected to much 
in the way of empirical scrutiny.36 The seminal research supporting the contention that 
juries are more reluctant to convict than judges in sexual assault cases is the USA study by 
Kalven and Zeisel.37 The study found that in ‘simple’ rape cases (acquaintance rapes with 
no aggravating factors) the judges who heard these cases would have convicted as much as 
seven times more often than the jury.38 In the absence of aggravating circumstances, or if 
the complainant and assailant were known to each other, the jury essentially refused to 
convict of rape charges, on the basis that involuntary intercourse under such circumstances 
did not attract the gravity of rape .39 In the study, the judges also explained the judicial and 
juror disagreement through allusion to jury perceptions of the ‘contributory fault of the 
victim’.40 Mirroring the apparent acquittal policy endorsed by jurors in acquaintance rape 
cases, in recent judicial interviews in England, judges cited examples of where judges 
would have convicted and the jury acquitted in rape trials, and accounted for this on basis 
that juries are reluctant to convict in cases of relationship rapes or previous intimate 
relationships.41 
 
Admittedly, the Kalven and Zeisel study is now over forty-five years old, and suffers from 
the key methodological deficiency posed by the reliance on the judges’ perceptions of the 
reasons for their disagreement with the jury. 42  Thus, the study can, at best ‘provide 
tentative support for the idea that judge-only trials might reduce the justice gap’.43 There is 
a lack of more recent research into comparing judge and jury decision-making, including 
Scotland.44 Although there are difficulties inherent to this type of research, a systematic 
analysis of jury and non-jury trials in rape cases has been viewed as desirable and valuable 
suggestions for how this research might be pursued have been put forward.45 It might even 
be suggested that Scotland, as a relatively small jurisdiction with a small pool of judges 
permitted to preside over rape trials may provide a good selection for further research.                                                          
36 See B Krahé and J Temkin, ‘Addressing the Attitude Problem in Rape Trials: Some Proposals and Methodological 
Considerations’ in MAH Horvath and JM Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking (2009) 301 
37 H Kalven and H Zeisel, The American Jury (1966) 
38 Ibid at 253-254 
39 Ibid at 250 
40 Ibid at 249-54 
41 J Temkin and B Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (2008) at 133 
42 Krahé and Temkin (n 36) at 313 
43 Temkin and Krahé (n 41) at 180 
44 There is some limited research, which involved a judicial survey of Scottish judges into judicial/juror agreement. 
Unfortunately this survey only explored the extent to which Scottish judges agree with jury verdicts of guilty. Whilst 
this survey demonstrates a high degree of concurrence in relation to convictions, the survey’s ambit unfortunately did 
not extend to evaluating the extent to which Scottish judges agree with jury acquittals – see T Lundmark, ‘“Split 
verdicts” in Scotland: a judicial survey’ (2010) 14(2) Edin LR 225 
45 Krahé and Temkin (n 36) at 313-14 
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A difficulty with the proposition to substitute the jury with a judge based system, without 
robust empirical evidence to support that judges are less likely to deny instances of non-
consensual sexual intercourse as rape, is the explicit elitism accompanying the idea. It 
might be a fallacy to assume that judges are not susceptible to the same invidious 
prejudices and preconceptions about rape that jurors are, and for some commentators this 
remains a source of hesitation in fully recommending this approach.46  Equally, there is 
growing recognition that this risk may be countermanded by the role of professional 
experience and the scope for professional training.47 There is existing evidence suggesting 
that judges who are made aware of the risk that their decisions could be influenced by 
implicit bias, possess the cognitive skills necessary to avoid that influence.48 
 
As discussed earlier, mental representations or ‘prototypes’ held by jurors, in this context 
the ‘real rape’ paradigm, can mean that jurors do not scrutinise evidence properly. 
However, a substantial empirical study of judicial decision-making has indicated that 
judges are less susceptible than other decision-makers’ to the effects of this 
‘representativeness’ bias. 49  Furthermore, from a defence perspective it is thought, on 
matters of credibility, easier to persuade a jury to entertain doubt as to the defendant’s 
guilt. 50   There is evidence suggesting that legal professionals also benefit from their 
professional experience when judging credibility. A study comparing credibility ratings by 
court judges with those made by lay people found that, in contrast to lay people, court 
judges were not affected by the emotional expression displayed by the witness when 
judging credibility.51 Furthermore, their votes for a guilty verdict were not influenced by 
the emotions displayed by the witness.52 Thus, there is some current research indicating 
that experience and training can limit the effect of biases in judicial decision-making.53 
Whilst these paint a positive picture, the key point is that there is likely to be more scope 
and opportunity for judicial training within existing structures, than is ever likely for juror 
education and training.54                                                         
46 Krahé & Temkin (n 36) at 312 
47 J Finn, E Mcdonald and Y Tinsley, ‘Identifying and Qualifying the Decision-Maker: the Case for Specialisation’ in E 
McDonald and Y Tinsley (eds), From "Real Rape" to Real Justice : Prosecuting Rape in New Zealand (2011) 221 at 
264-268; see also submission of S Wallerstein in ‘Making Good Law’ (BBC World Service, 10 March 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0162r3f> accessed 30 July 2013 
48 C Guthrie and others, ‘Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?’ (2009) 84(3) Notre Dame L Rev 09-11 
49 C Guthrie, JJ Rachlinski and AJ Wistrich, ‘Inside the judicial mind’ (2000) 86(4) Cornell L Rev 777 at 816 
50 J Jackson and S Doran, ‘The case for jury waiver’ [1997] Crim LR 155 at 160; see also Temkin and Krahé (n 41) at 
ch. 6 
51 E Wessel and others, ‘Credibility of the Emotional Witness: A Study of Rates by Court Judges’ (2006) 30(2) Law 
and Human Behavior 221 
52 Ibid 
53 For a discursive summary see Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 47) at 241-243 
54 Ibid at 248; Temkin and Krahé (n 41) at 178 
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Furthermore, even though there may be limited empirical evidence to substantiate the 
hypothesis that trial by a judge or panel of judges alone would improve the quality of 
justice, the objectivity of a judicial decision may readily be thought increased by the fact 
that judges give reasons for their verdicts. The concerns raised in chapter 2 over juror 
incompetency in understanding or applying the relevant sexual offences law, adds to the 
case for the decision to be made by legally qualified person or persons. 
 
Similarly, a reasoned judicial decision would promote transparency in a rape trial. A 
number of European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) decisions have referred to the 
desirability of tribunals of fact giving reasons for decisions,55 although the fact that a jury 
does not give reasons for its decision is not of itself contrary to the ECHR.56 Whilst this 
later position was ostensibly reaffirmed in the recent Taxquet v Belgium decision, 57 
commentators have regarded the judgment as containing undercurrents which call into 
question the continued survival of unreasoned general verdict. 58  To this extent, it is 
suggested that a reasoned judicial verdict in a rape trial would be a more appropriate way 
of satisfying the requirement to give reasons under Article 6 of the ECHR, than expecting 
a jury to give reasons. Furthermore, the quality of a judicial statement would likely offer a 
more incisive and logical justification of the verdict to both the accused and the court.59 
 
A further way of seeing the position with rape trials is as representing a need for 
specialisation. 60  That rape and serious sexual offending poses a unique problem is 
recognised, and this acknowledgment has already prompted differential and specialised 
response at many stages of the criminal process. To this extent, an extension of 
specialisation to the judiciary is complementary, and to question the logic of continued lay 
participation as part of the legal response to rape, is apt. In England, although the jury 
makes the determination of guilt or innocence, judges who preside over rape cases are 
‘rape ticketed’, which means they are obligated to attend the serious sexual assault 
seminars provided by the Judicial Studies Board.61 Although the Scottish judiciary is held 
in high esteem, they receive minimal training before they begin presiding over cases.                                                         
55 See eg. Murray v UK 1996 22 EHRR 29 
56 See eg. Saric v Denmark 1992 DR 72 
57 (2012) 54 EHRR 26 
58 See Duff (n 21); P Roberts, ‘Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Require Reasoned 
Verdicts in Criminal Trials?’ (2011) 11(2) Human Rights Law Review 213 
59 See Fitzpatrick (n 17) and SC Thaman, ‘Should Criminal Juries Give Reasons for Their Verdicts: The Spanish 
Experience and the Implications of the European Court of Human Rights Decision in Taxquet v. Belgium’ (2011) 86 
Chi-Kent L Rev 613 
60 For this proposition in New Zealand see Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 47) at 258 
61 Temkin and Krahé (n 41) at 191  
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Studies in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, have revealed some judicial reluctance to 
create a specialist body of judges, predicated on the argument that the law pertaining to 
sexual offences is not overly complex, and any judge should be competent, and considered 
to be competent, to hear sexual offences cases. 62  It is entirely possible that similar 
opposition might arise in Scotland. However, such a ‘view is open to challenge on the 
basis that sexual offending is different from other forms of offending and complainants 
have particular needs to be attended to’.63 
 
It is argued that, even though there is a lack of definitive empirical support, there is 
tentative support that judges alone may be less likely to limit unjust direct acquittals which 
disqualify complainers for their failure to conform to rape myth expectations. Most 
importantly, as Dripps argues in the USA, removing the jury eliminates popular opinion as 
a check on prosecutorial discretion.64  A judge based system might also diminish attrition 
and reduce disqualification through ‘upstream’ decision-making by police and prosecutors 
as to which cases to progress.65 
 
4.3(b) Reducing Trauma 
 
Secondly, an aim to assess a judge based decision-making process against, is the extent to 
which it might reduce re-victimisation through improving the treatment of individual 
complainers. This forms part of a growing re-conceptualisation of the complainer’s 
peripheral position in the criminal justice process generally, and awareness of the need to 
redress the processes’ subordination of the individual complainer’s interests and needs. 66 
This measure of effectiveness assumes increasing significance given little evidence that the 
position of complainers has improved, despite all the reforms that have been made towards 
this aim. 
 
Thus, what is appropriate should be measured against the extent to which a reform will 
help shift the position of the complainer in a rape prosecution from ‘harmful’ to 
‘habitable’, improve the accessibility of the system to all victims and protect the autonomy 
and dignity of the individual complainer, by realising their interests as a central rather than 
                                                        
62 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Sexual Offences: Final Report (2004) at para 3.102 
63 Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 47) at 267 
64 Dripps D, ‘After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault’ (2008) 41 Akron 
L Rev 957 at 973 
65 See earlier at 2.1(a) 
66 See eg. JL Herman, ‘Justice from the victim’s perspective’ (2005) 11(5) Violence Against Women 571; F Raitt (n 30) 
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marginal concern.67 The pivotal question to be asked is whether the proposed alternative 
may be more empirically likely to minimise re-victimisation through the ‘courtroom rape’. 
 
The NZLC considered that ‘a stronger case can be made for trial by judge alone in sexual 
cases by reference to the trauma which complainants can experience in giving evidence of 
an intimate and painful nature before a group of strangers’. 68 Whilst this is true, the 
difficulty with this line of reasoning, which conflates the complainer’s trauma in testifying 
with the jury’s physical presence, is that it too readily lends itself to a solution based in the 
exploration of alternative ways of giving evidence to alleviate the traumatic nature of the 
trial.69 Where available, the use of special measures do provide the capacity to spare the 
indignity of giving evidence about personal and intimate matters in the physical presence 
of the jury, and the accused. Yet, as a solution, it is problematic for two reasons. 
 
Firstly, an answer based on ‘special measures’ is illusory, as there is rarely any 
consideration given to the dynamics of the use of alternative ways.70 It is problematic to 
the extent that a critical facet of any protective legislation is the approach taken to 
eligibility for special measures, and it can be unusual for a complainant to be granted 
special measures on the grounds of trauma alone.71 In Scotland, the ‘special measures’ 
available for vulnerable witnesses are not automatically available to rape complainers, and 
there is as yet no clear evidence their introduction has made a material difference to the 
ordeal of giving evidence in rape trials in Scotland.72 Whilst there is currently a bill to 
make special measures an explicit right for complainers in sexual offences cases in 
Scotland, 73  experiential comparison with other jurisdictions, where the right of rape 
complainant has been automatic, discloses a fragmented approach to the identification of 
adult vulnerable witnesses. 74  However, as discussed in chapter 2 jurors expect a 
complainer to be visibly upset, thus a further salient issue is whether these alternative ways 
of giving evidence could illegitimately affect juror’s perceptions of credibility. 75  If a 
complainer gives evidence through alternative measures then they may be less nervous and 
emotional than if giving live testimony in the courtroom in the traditional manner.76 This                                                         
67 Larcombe (n 2) at 39 
68 NZLC (n 34) at paras 197-198 
69 Indeed, this was proposed solution of NZLC - see ibid 
70 Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 47) at 251 
71 In New Zealand see ibid 
72 P Richards, S Morris and E Richards, Turning up the Volume: The Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004 (2008) 
73 Victim and Witnesses (Scotland) Bill 2013 s.6 (introduced 6th Feb 2013); Scottish Government, Victim and Witnesses 
(Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum (2013) at para 69 
74 See M Burton, R Evans and A Sanders, Are special measures for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses working? 
Evidence from the criminal justice agencies (2006) at 34-5 
75 See E Mcdonald and Y Tinsley, ‘Evidence Issues’ in McDonald and Tinsley (n 47) 279 at 284 
76 Ibid 
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may rather perversely present the adult rape complainer who qualifies as a vulnerable 
witness with a seemingly no-win situation. Paradoxically, through utilising special 
measures they may risk compromising their own credibility, meaning it could be in the 
interests of the complainer to endure the more distressing environment of the courtroom. 
This is consistent with a prosecutorial perception that some juries will be less receptive to 
witnesses who give their evidence using special measures, and that witnesses who exhibit 
obvious signs of distress whilst giving evidence in front of the jury may be considered 
more credible.77 
 
The second reason that special measures provide only the illusion of an answer is that, 
ascribing the ‘traumatic’ nature of a sexual offence trial to the distress to the complainer by 
the disclosure of evidence within physical presence of the jury, as the NZLC did, is a 
rather narrow one-dimensional perception of the hostility of the adjudicative environment. 
It betrays a relatively superficial estimation of the role of the jury in the creation and 
exacerbation of the complainer’s trauma. It is contended that, instead, the real issue is to 
extent to which role of the jury precipitates what is perceptibly the deeper nature of the 
systematic trauma experienced by complainers, through cross-examination and defence 
exploitation of rape myths. 
 
Thus, in evaluating whether a judge or panel of judges would be an appropriate decision-
maker, a more comprehensive and wider view is to focus on the dynamics of the trial. In 
New Zealand, it has been hypothesised that judge alone trials for serious sexual offending 
would result in a different type of cross-examination and a more active bench, both of 
which are factors that could influence the experience of complainants in cases of sexual 
offending, and reduce the likelihood of re-victimisation.78 
 
A judge based system could diminish the ‘courtroom rape’ because: 
It also seems likely that in the absence of a jury, the tone and quality of rape 
trials would improve substantially as counsel, free from the need to convince 
juries by fair means or foul, would be less inclined to indulge in some of the 
excesses which even now characterise rape trials. A strong cross-examination 
of complainants would still be necessary, but the experience of victims should 
nonetheless become less painful and traumatic.79 
                                                         
77 Reid Howie Associates, Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses: Review of Provisions in Other Jurisdictions (2002) 
78 Finn, Mcdonald and Tinsley (n 47) at 251 
79 Temkin and Krahé (n 41) at 178-179 
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This assumes increasing prominence in light of a states’ positive obligation to protect 
physical and moral integrity of any individual, including his or her sexual life, under 
Article 8 of the ECHR.  The complainer as an individual citizen is owed basic human 
rights under Article 8, even though they are not designated any particular rights as a trial 
participant under the adversarial system. The subjection of complainers’ to invasive and 
irrelevant questioning relating to sexual history or character evidence has been argued to 
constitute a breach of this right.80 This dissension is present amongst judicial ranks, as 
Baroness Hale recognised: 
A legal system which allows wide-ranging cross-examination about the sexual 
history of a complainant, clearly aimed at prejudicing the jury against her… 
might one day be held to be incompatible with the effective deterrence required 
by Art 8.81  
 
While the removal of the jury would likely alter the dynamic of cross-examination, this 
would also simultaneously relieve the judiciary of the perplexities of intervention. If the 
excesses of cross-examination were curtailed, judges may be left less often to move to 
prevent or restrict cross-examination. Although, in Scotland, judges are required to ensure 
the ‘appropriate protection of the complainer’s dignity and privacy’ when exercising their 
discretion to admit sexual history and character evidence under s.275, it has been argued 
that the judiciary: 
[S]hould adopt a more robust and consistent approach to the questions of 
specificity and relevance and, further, that there is greater scope for refusing 
S.275 applications on the basis that the probative value of the evidence is 
outweighed by the interests of the complainer.82  
However, contributing to this judicial inertia is that ‘judges are always concerned not to 
intervene is such a way as to trigger an appeal and lead to the possible quashing of a 
conviction’.83 A change in the dynamic of cross-examination may alleviate present concern 
that judges are reticent to intervene, motivated by the impetus of grounds for appeal, if an 
accused perceives the judge has been biased.84 
 
Thus, it would appear that a judge based decision-making apparatus may meet the goals of 
making the process less painful for complainers, thus helping shift their position in a rape                                                         
80 RCS, Rape Crisis Response to the Recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission Report on Rape and Sexual 
Offences (2008) <http://www.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk/documents/RCSconsultationresponseMar083.pdf> accessed 
30 July 2013 at 1-2 
81 DS v HM ADV [2007] UKPC 36 at para 95 
82 P Duff, 'The Scottish 'rape shield': as good as it gets?' (2011) 15(2) Edin LR 218-242 at 241 
83 Raitt (n 30) at para 7.30 
84 Ibid 
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prosecution from ‘harmful’ to ‘habitable’; in addition to creating a environment more 
conducive to protecting the autonomy and dignity of the individual complainer.  
 
There is a need to reduce systematic trauma both to protect individual complainers but also 
to improve the criminal justice system’s response to rape generally, given the process is 
inextricably linked and self-perpetuating. The salient point is that if the removal of the jury 
did serve to lessen the systematic trauma of cross-examination, this would likely exert a 
positive influence at earlier stages of the process. It may help diminish the chronic under-
reporting of rape, given that the fear of cross-examination and attacks on their sexual 
history and character remains a renowned disincentive to the reporting of rape.85 It is also 
possible that without defence playing to the jury, this could limit the extent of any current 
any prosecutorial exclusions based upon ‘credible’ complainers who will ‘stand up’ well in 
front of a jury.86 In turn this would promote the accessibility of the justice system to all 
victims of rape. 
 
4.4 The Way Forward 
 
If a reformed judge based decision-making system were to replace the current jury model 
in rape trials in Scotland, it would neither be procedurally illegitimate, nor detract from the 
legitimacy of a conviction. As noted, public support for the jury, even if a rather blind 
adherence based on abstract attraction, could lead to objection.  However, if the public 
were presented with a cogent argument in support of a judge based decision-making 
process in rape cases, and paused long enough to remove their rose-tinted spectacles, it is 
suggested that there may be more support for this option than is conventionally recognised.  
 
As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, there is cause to anticipate that a reformed judge 
based decision-making system would improve the quality of decision-making in rape trials. 
It is submitted that a judicial based process is more conducive to the objective 
administration of the law and reducing the unwarranted disqualification and trauma 
experienced by complainers. This shift towards a specialised judge based decision-making 
forum in rape trials would complement the increasing specialisation in the investigative 
and prosecutorial stages of the legal response to rape. Significantly, to the extent that 
attrition in rape cases constitutes a vicious cycle, the substitution of the jury may entail the 
removal of the most problematic link in the chain.                                                         
85 COPFS, Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006) at para 2.8; RCS (n 80) at 1-2 
86 For discussion of this goal generally, see Larcombe (n 2) at 39 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the potential impact of prejudicial social 
attitudes on jury decision-making in rape trials in Scotland, and to question whether the 
jury should continue to determine the verdict. 
 
Scotland, as elsewhere, continues to struggle with high attrition in rape cases. The limited 
success of rape law and policy reform to date, in terms of improving conviction rates or 
reducing the re-victimsation experienced by complainers during the legal process, was 
discussed in chapter 1. This was considered within the context of negative or prejudicial 
social attitudes about rape and rape victims.  The four broad categories of rape myths 
identified were ‘women cry rape’ myths, ‘real rape’ myths, victim precipitation myths and 
consent myths.  
 
The potential influence of these four categories of rape myths on jury decision-making was 
assessed in Chapter 2. There is a clear implication that jurors may ignore or misapply the 
law, and continue to infuse the rape mythologies identified with decision-making. The 
evidence strongly suggests that where attrition does occur ‘on consideration of the 
evidence by the jury at the conclusion of a trial’ in Scotland, negative social attitudes are 
key to explaining high acquittal rates. It was demonstrated that there has to be major doubt 
over the jury’s central role as ultimate arbiters of guilt or innocence in rape trials and that 
the jury certainly cannot be relied upon to objectively deliver the law. In turn, this situation 
undermines the criminal law’s progressive commitment to sexual autonomy under the 
SO(S)A 2009.  
 
The scope to counter prejudicial attitudes amongst jurors was considered in Chapter 3. It 
was found that the collective process of deliberation is not an effective safeguard against 
the influence of prejudicial attitudes, and further that the conceptualisation of the jury as an 
educative institution in rape trials is misguided.  It was also identified that wider changes 
in social attitudes constitute a long-term goal rather than an immediate solution. Similarly, 
the limited efficacy of educational guidance, namely judicial direction and expert evidence, 
in rape trials was discussed. Neither measure seems likely to address the range of negative 
social attitudes amongst jurors.  
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It has been stated that, ‘[p]eople should realize that juries acquit, it’s not the system, the 
system doesn’t fail women: we as a society fail them’.1  This sentiment surely raises the 
question of whether, actually, the criminal justice system does fail rape victims by 
continuing to use the jury as the decisive part of the institutional response to rape.  
 
The reporting of rape has increased in Scotland, and despite the challenges in the 
prosecution of rape cases victims of rape, and other sexual offences, are urged to come 
forward.2  Yet, it is only ethical to encourage victims to report when reporting will ensure 
that participation in the criminal justice process neither unjustly excludes nor exacerbates 
the complainers’s injury, thereby administering a ‘second assault’.3  This is increasingly 
difficult to reconcile with the evidence that indicates that the retention of the jury means 
the perpetuation of a criminal justice system that both marginalises and exacerbates the 
traumatic experiences of significant numbers of rape complainers. 
 
As a result of the findings in chapters 2 and 3, an alternative to the use of jury trials was 
considered in chapter 4. This examination concluded that the use of a judge based 
decision-making system in rape trials would be more likely ensure the impartial 
application of the law, and reduce the unjustified disqualification of complainers. It was 
also argued that a judge based system would be more conducive to alleviating the 
systematic trauma experienced by complainers, as it would likely limit the excesses of 
defence exploitation of negative social attitudes at trial. Without the jury perpetuating the 
vicious circularity of the legal response to rape, it was argued that such a system would 
make justice more accessible to all rape victims and diminish exclusionary prosecutorial 
practices. This recommendation for a specialised judge based decision-making forum in 
rape trials enhances the ongoing specialisation at other stages of the criminal justice 
system’s response to rape. It is an option that should be examined further in the Scottish 
context to see how it might operate in practice.  
 
As noted at the outset of this thesis the criminal justice system has a baseline institutional 
responsibility to ensure the objective implementation of the law in practice and to ensure 
that the cost to the complainer of seeking justice is not re-victimisation. Against this                                                         
1 Comment of a barrister during interview: J Temkin and B Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of 
Attitude (2008) at 132 
2 COPFS, ‘Serious sexual offenders are being brought to justice’ (7 May 2013) 
<http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/media-site/media-releases/262-serious-sexual-offenders-are-being-brought-to-
justice> accessed 30 July 2013 
3 W Larcombe, 'Falling Rape Conviction Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for Rape Laws' (2011) 19(1) 
Fem LS 27 at 42; see also JL Herman, ‘Justice from the victim’s perspective’ (2005) 11(5) Violence Against Women 
571 
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framework, it is concluded that the jury is guilty of being an inappropriate decision-making 
body in rape trials in Scotland. This conviction arises because of far reaching impact of 
negative social attitudes amongst jurors in individual cases and their wider contribution to 
the inescapable circularity of the legal response to rape. It is recommended that there is 
clear potential for a judge based decision-making process to fulfill this institutional 
responsibility. In conclusion, lay participation in decision-making at trial should be 
discontinued, with this review of the jury’s role essential to redressing the ‘relative 
impunity’4 with which rape occurs in Scotland. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 M Burman, ‘Evidencing Sexual Assault: Women in the witness box’ (2009) 56(4) Probation Journal 1 at 17 
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